Introduction
The Karnataka High Court’s recent decision in X Corp. (formerly Twitter) v. Union of India has thrust India’s digital regulation framework into the constitutional spotlight. At the centre of the litigation is the Sahyog Portal, launched in October 2024 as an online system to centralise government takedown requests to intermediaries. The court upheld Sahyog, using the terminology of a mere “digital post-office” that forwards requests without granting new powers. Sahyog streamlined procedures, ended duplication, and ensured authenticity of requests, the Court held.
However, this formalist argument ignores a broader constitutional issue. In empowering vast Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, State Governments, and even local police officials to order takedowns pursuant to Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, 2000, Sahyog increasingly oversteps state censorship authority beyond the strict bounds set by the Supreme Court of India in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India.
Section 79 and Section 69A: Two Distinct Channels
Section 79 of the IT Act was conceived as a safe harbour shielding intermediaries from liability for user-generated content. However, Section 79(3)(b) threatens this immunity if the intermediary fails to remove information upon obtaining “actual knowledge” of its illegality.
In Shreya Singhal, the Supreme Court foresaw the dangers of this formulation. If “actual knowledge” were read literally, intermediaries would act as arbiters of legality, pre-emptively censoring speech. To avert this chilling effect, the Court confined the loss of safe harbour to two narrow pathways:
(1) Court orders, and
(2) Government blocking orders under Section 69A, issued in compliance with the 2009 Blocking Rules and limited to Article 19(2) grounds.
As paragraph 121 of the judgment clarified:
“The intermediary applying its own mind to whether information should or should not be blocked is noticeably absent in Section 69A read with the 2009 Rules.”
Thus, Shreya Singhal read Section 79(3)(b) down to prevent precisely the kind of decentralised, executive-driven censorship that Sahyog now facilitates.
The Sahyog Dilemma
Sahyog reverses this equilibrium. Under Rule 3(1)(d) executive notifications of the IT Rules, 2021, a series of officials from the Ministry of Defence to the State police officials can now issue takedown notices pursuant to Section 79(3)(b).
The October 2023 notice by MeitY requested all of the central Ministries, State governments, and local police to make blocking directions under Section 79(3)(b), without invoking the Section 69A procedure. The Ministry of Home Affairs gave clearance to the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre to make blocking directions using Sahyog. State notices in West Bengal, Goa, Delhi, Punjab, and elsewhere granted local police to make takedowns.
The Karnataka High Court itself verifies that their police officials in over 25 states and union territories take advantage of this power, with rationales varied as far apart as “unlawful information” or “violations of any law.”
This system gives three immediate outcomes:
- Multiplicity of authorities – Hundreds of thousands of nodal officers throughout India can order takedowns without using the centralized Section 69A procedure.
- Vague standards – Orders set abstract standards such as “any unlawful act,” way beyond Article 19(2).
- Coercive compliance – Intermediaries face loss of safe harboring should they decline, promoting over-compliance.
Sahyog not only enables requests of a legal nature. It systematically violates Shreya Singhal’s doctrinal structures, reducing Section 79(3)(b) to a censorship tool.
Constitutional Faultlines
The constitutional challenge to Sahyog is to be read through Articles 14 and 19 and its strain with Shreya Singhal.
Article 19(1)(a): Over-Compliance and the Chilling Effect
Unlike Section 69A, which mandates notice, hearing, and reasoned orders, Sahyog operates without user intimation or transparency. The threat of safe-harbour loss coerces intermediaries into self-censorship. This “indirect restriction” on speech mirrors what the Supreme Court warned against in Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, (1986), where compelled conformity was held violative of Article 19(1)(a).
Here too, intermediaries though not directly compelled are placed under legal duress: comply or risk liability. This converts voluntary compliance into compelled silence, contradicting Shreya Singhal’s safeguards and producing a systemic chilling effect on journalism, satire, political commentary, and dissent.
Article 14: Arbitrariness and Unequal Enforcement
By delegating takedown authority to a diffuse range of executive officers without a uniform standard, Sahyog violates the Article 14 prohibition on arbitrariness. Decisions made “according to the fancy and caprice of a nodal officer” replace rule-based governance with discretion-based censorship.
The absence of clear criteria or procedural safeguards leads to regional inconsistencies identical content may remain online in one State and be removed in another. Such asymmetry in state action undermines the equality principle embedded in Article 14 and the rule of law itself.
By extension, Sahyog subjects intermediaries to a coercive position, essentially forcing them to take down content even legal expression in order to escape liability, which is reminiscent of the indirect restrictions that were criticized in Bijoe Emmanuel.
The comparison is vivid:
Supreme Court (2015) in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015): Section 79(3)(b) is constitutional only if associated with court or reasoned orders issued under Section 69A, confined strictly to the grounds enumerated in Article 19(2).
Karnataka High Court (2025) in X Corp. (formerly Twitter Inc.) v. Union of India,(2025): Section 79(3)(b) can be utilized through the Sahyog Portal by diverse executive authorities, having been upheld as a facilitative mechanism per se.
This line of reasoning represents a pragmatic shift, but one that undermines constitutional discipline. Whereas Shreya Singhal read down, Sahyog brings back through executive notifications.
Conclusion and Way Forward
The High Court of Karnataka adopted pragmatism while insisting that Sahyog was imperative to deal with close to 100 crore internet users. Efficiency cannot, however, substitute for legality. Section 79(3)(b) managed to survive Shreya Singhal only by virtue of two conditions: court directions and Section 69A-consistent government directions under Article 19(2).
In empowering “all and sundry” to make takedowns, Sahyog violates these caveats and creates a new regime of censorship. Unless Parliament anchors Sahyog by statute, demands transparency reports, ensures user remedies, and insists on judicial review, the portal will go on to undercut the constitutional balance of liberty and regulation.
If Sahyog is to operate within constitutional limits, specific reforms are required:
- Statutory incorporation to define its scope and limits;
- Public reporting of requests and rationales by Sahyog;
- Notice and effective redress to affected consumers;
- And independent judicial or quasi-judicial scrutiny of takedown notices.
Within such reforms only can Sahyog strike a balance between efficiency and constitutional principle and make itself a legally sustainable system of regulation of legal content.
(This post has been authored by Akhil Yadav and Aditya Pratap Singh, second-year students at GNLU, Gandhinagar)
CITE AS: Akhil Yadav and Aditya Pratap Singh, ‘Efficiency or Executive Overreach? Karnataka HC’s Endorsement of the Sahyog Portal’ (The Contemporary Law Forum, 26 December 2025) <https://tclf.in/2025/12/26/efficiency-or-executive-overreach-karnataka-hcs-endorsement-of-the-sahyog-portal/> date of access.