Introduction and Position of Interventions in ICJ Proceedings Hitherto
The interventions before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have historically been rare, treated more as an exception than a norm. The ICJ Statute allows it in two narrow circumstances. Under Article 63, any State party to the treaty under interpretation may intervene and present its views on how it should be construed. This provision is delicately balanced, as the ICJ must protect the integrity of the dispute between the parties while recognising that some treaties make a greater claim than the two parties and are entitled to the value to the collective international community.
However, until recently, interventions were used sparingly while being cautiously permitted. The same were treated as peripheral contributions rather than central to the Court’s function. Ultimately, the restraint gave way to something new with The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar). For the first time in the ICJ, a State referred to the Genocide Convention not to invoke rights for its own people, but to claim obligations that all states owe towards all others, and finally to humanity itself. This reshaped the Court’s role because it was no longer merely an umpire over bilateral disputes, but a protector of collective human rights obligations.
This development kindles a broader question of what such interventions imply for the international legal order. In leaving bilateral conflict behind, the Court now presents new questions: whether the rise of such interventions enhances its legitimacy or potentially politicizes its work; whether these reflect a turn toward normative multilateralism based on mutual human rights commitments; and how States, particularly in the Global South, navigate this new landscape. This paper argues that the surge of Article 63 interventions marks a shift in the ICJ’s role—from resolving bilateral disputes to shaping shared global norms, especially in cases involving collective human rights obligations. The following discussion charts this course through The Gambia v. Myanmar’s recent evolution, discusses the legal role and boundaries of Article 63, and addresses the wider potential and perils of this growing practice before returning to India’s position.
This shift also raises difficult questions for States like India. Although a signatory to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, also known as the Genocide Convention, India has so far chosen to remain on the sidelines of intervention proceedings before the ICJ. Its eventual stance on interventions will signal whether it wishes to prioritize sovereignty and flexibility, or to take a more active role in shaping how the Court interprets collective human rights obligations.
Article 63 And The Recent Developments In The Gambia V. Myanmar
Article 63 of the Statute of the ICJ is in a special position among international adjudication. It is a general rule permitting any State party to a multilateral treaty to intervene when the meaning of that treaty is in dispute before the Court. Intervention does not make the intervening State a party to the case nor permit argument on the facts. Instead, it permits States to interpret the treaty for themselves and have the meaning of the treaty be the one held in common between all the parties to it. This provision is evidence of the multilateral character of such treaties, particularly those, like the Genocide Convention, which safeguard duties towards the international community.
The importance of this Article follows from the very roots of the jurisprudence of the Court. In Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro (2007), the ICJ reaffirmed that the prohibition on genocide is not a two-way obligation but an obligation owed erga omnes to the international community. Similarly, in Croatia v. Serbia (2015), the Court reaffirmed that the Genocide Convention does bear testimony to collective responsibility, even though the case itself turned on evidence of intent. These rulings provided the foundation upon which the Court’s understanding of Article 63 has evolved.
This evolution reached a watershed moment in The Gambia v. Myanmar. The case was brought on 11 November 2019, when proceedings were instituted against Myanmar for its breaches of the Genocide Convention through mass killings, rape, and forced displacement of the Rohingya. On 23 January 2020, the ICJ ruled provisional measures compelling Myanmar to desist from acts of genocide and to preserve evidence, a robust affirmation of the preventive component of the Convention.
A key development came on 22 July 2022, when the Court rejected Myanmar’s preliminary objections, confirming that The Gambia did have standing and once again expressing that obligations under the Genocide Convention are of an erga omnes partes character. This opened the door to a deluge of interventions under Article 63. Eleven States had sought to intervene by mid-2025, and on 25 July 2025, the Court received interventions by Slovenia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Belgium, and Ireland, joined by those of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the Maldives.
This level of engagement is unprecedented, and not just numerically. It reflects a broader shift in expectations about collective action. Part of the momentum stems from the post-Ukraine push to treat atrocity prevention as a shared responsibility; part of it comes from active norm-shaping by several Global North states. For others, intervention is strategic signalling—a low-cost way to demonstrate commitment to human rights. The “unprecedented” nature of these interventions is therefore driven by changing political incentives, not merely volume. The Gambia v. Myanmar is therefore not only a test of Myanmar’s compliance with the Genocide Convention, but also a moment of change in how Article 63 is used. While the ICJ’s formal function remains bilateral and its ratio decidendi is not collective, the surge in interventions has shifted the character of its interpretive process, drawing it closer to a forum where multiple states shape the meaning of shared treaty norms.
Promise and Risks of Broader Interventions
This burst of intervention highlights two important shifts. First, preventing genocide is not just the sole responsibility of two opposing States but an obligation of the entire international community. Second, it gives more legitimacy to the ICJ because its judgments are widely accepted when based on multiple voices rather than confined to the parties’ arguments directly before it.
However, this suffers from limitations. Myanmar has pushed back in its submissions to the Court, objecting that too many interventions risk distorting the scope of the dispute and infringing on its procedural rights. There is also the risk of judicial overload when numerous States join in, which can slow proceedings while stretching out cases and delaying justice for the victims the process is meant to protect. Moreover, critics argue that interventions could politicise the ICJ and turn it into a stage for diplomatic signalling rather than legal argument. At the same time, the fear of politicisation may be overstated when set against the Court’s existing democratic deficit, where only a narrow set of states typically shape international adjudication. Another caution lies in the ICJ’s practice itself. While States may intervene, the Court is not bound to adopt their interpretations. Interventions can be symbolic expressions of solidarity rather than decisive influences on jurisprudence. In past cases, the ICJ has acknowledged intervenors but ultimately relied on its own reasoning. The normative balance therefore lies somewhere in the middle: interventions broaden participation without fundamentally altering the Court’s decision-making core. The real challenge is institutional, raising the question of whether the ICJ should consider procedural reforms—such as structured written rounds or limits on duplicative submissions—to manage wider participation without undermining efficiency. Thus, interventions signal solidarity and collective responsibility and help the Court evolve into a more inclusive forum for shared interpretation of international law.
Interventions as “Normative Multilateralism”
One of the most striking features of The Gambia v. Myanmar is how interventions have transformed the ICJ into a forum of normative multilateralism. Traditionally, the Court resolves bilateral disputes. However, when eleven states step forward under Article 63, the Court resembles a collective chamber for global norm-setting. This does not mean the ICJ acquires legislative power, but the process takes on a quasi-legislative character in the limited sense that multiple states simultaneously articulate how a universal treaty should be understood, creating a shared interpretive record that extends beyond the immediate parties. The Court still decides the case bilaterally, yet the accumulation of state interpretations gives its rulings a systemic weight that edges treaty interpretation closer to norm-shaping rather than mere dispute settlement. Therefore, Treaty interpretation becomes a quasi-legislative act, informed by multiple sovereign voices but delivered with judicial authority.
At the same time, this shift introduces inevitable tensions. The ICJ is not a parliament, and it lacks a democratic mandate. Unlike legislation, its judgments formally bind only the parties to the dispute. Intervenors may be heard but not bound, and their influence remains filtered through the Court’s discretion. In this sense, ‘normative multilateralism’ is both a promise and an exaggeration: it suggests a move toward collective governance, yet the Court’s procedural and jurisdictional limits keep that promise in check. What emerges is a narrower form of multilateralism in interpretation rather than in law-making, where multiple States shape meaning without altering the Court’s fundamentally judicial role.
Still, interventions fill a structural gap. There is no permanent international tribunal to hold States criminally responsible for genocide, as international criminal law focuses on individuals. Article 63 interventions offer a way for States to shape, and indirectly enforce collectively, obligations of prevention and punishment. In this sense, legal interpretation becomes a form of enforcement, a subtle but significant evolution.
The choice for India and much of the Global South is not simply sovereignty versus participation. It is whether to remain passive while others define the meaning of universal treaties, or to step forward and shape the trajectory of international law. Staying silent entails its own risks. The emerging body of global justice could be shaped mainly through Western perspectives, leaving other voices unheard. By participating, even cautiously, India and other States can help ensure a more balanced jurisprudence where the diversity of geopolitical experiences helps define the meaning of humanity’s most fundamental norms.
India’s Position: Between Principle and Pragmatism
India has always been wary of international tribunals. In 1974, it receded from the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction following the Right of Passage case against Portugal. That move reflected a clear preference: safeguard sovereignty and keep external forums at arm’s length. The same reflex governs India’s silence regarding interventions in The Gambia v. Myanmar. This caution also informs India’s approach to interventions under Article 63, where stepping in could shape treaty interpretation and expose India to legal scrutiny.
India ratified the Genocide Convention in 1959, subject to a reservation under Article IX requiring consent of all parties before the International Court of Justice can hear disputes. On paper, this signals a formal commitment. In practice, however, India avoids being drawn into ICJ litigation. Instead, it raises concerns through the UN General Assembly or bilateral diplomacy rather than judicial interventions. By not intervening, India maintains flexibility in how global norms around genocide are interpreted, but also cedes ground to other States in shaping collective understandings under Article 63. This reflects a deliberate strategic choice: joining interventions could invite reciprocal scrutiny of India’s own record in Kashmir, the Northeast, and episodes of communal violence.
India’s response to the Rohingya crisis is one of that delicate balance. When waves of Rohingya refugees flooded into India after the Myanmar violence in 2017, the government called them “illegal immigrants” and not victims of persecution. It justified deportations in a challenge before the Supreme Court. At the same time, India provided humanitarian aid to the Bangladesh camps and insisted on safe conditions in Rakhine State. The word was unambiguous: India would interact with humanitarian issues, but not on the terms that would set legal positions for use as precedents for foreign supervision of its own policy. This mirrors its broader approach to ICJ interventions: support global norms in principle, but avoid formal legal positions that could limit discretion or influence treaty interpretation.
The UN employs the same strategy. India criticized violence in Myanmar in 2017 and again after the 2021 coup, but did not join resolutions holding Myanmar directly responsible for genocide. Its General Assembly and Human Rights Council abstentions reflect a clear line: condemn violence, demand accountability, but not legal determinations that might come back to haunt India itself. Through this selective engagement, India positions itself to weigh in on global norms without becoming a formal participant in ICJ treaty interpretations, showing how it navigates collective obligations cautiously.
This position is not new. As early as 1971, India had articulated its intervention in East Pakistan partially in humanitarian terms, referencing the atrocities of Pakistan. However, even then, it hesitated to seek international judicial remedies and instead turned to state practice and political acknowledgement of Bangladesh. Now, that same pragmatism informs its position on ICJ interventions. That same pragmatism now informs India’s stance toward Article 63 interventions, balancing principle, sovereignty, and the opportunity to influence evolving legal norms.
India today has a decision to make. Remaining outside maintains flexibility and avoids legal exposure. However, silence pays a price. Western nations and smaller nations such as the Maldives are influencing the interpretation of the Genocide Convention. If India keeps staying out, it loses interpretive terrain to others. That weakens its pretension to leadership in the Global South and erodes its aspiration to be regarded as a moral voice on human rights. If India stays out, it risks losing interpretive terrain under Article 63 to others, limiting its ability to shape how collective obligations are understood and applied in future cases. Its absence does not halt the emerging turn toward normative multilateralism, but it does shift that turn toward a narrower and less globally representative coalition. India’s abstention therefore pluralizes participation rather than undermining it, although it sidelines India from a conversation that increasingly shapes the meaning of universal norms.
India’s stance, therefore, is not one of passive resistance but rather one of deliberate restraint. The world, however, is changing. The ICJ is becoming a platform on which universal rules take form. If India continues to spectate from the sidelines, it stands to be left behind while others determine the norms it will have to live by someday.
Way Forward and Conclusion
With Eleven States engaged, The Gambia v. Myanmar has made the ICJ something new: a forum for collective stewardship of treaty norms, particularly where genocide and other jus cogens breaches are in issue. Interventions are no longer on the periphery but at the heart of how the Court applies universal obligations.
The future of intervention before the ICJ will hinge not just upon States’ participation, but also upon how the Court manages inclusion against the imperative of effective adjudication. On the one hand, interventions enable diverse points of view to contribute to judgments. On the other hand, they can lengthen proceedings, bring political pressures to bear, or imperil procedural complexity. The question is not whether interventions must be, but how they are practised to influence jurisprudence significantly.
For India, the challenge is both strategic and of principle. Ongoing abstention maintains freedom of choice and avoids exposure to law, but threatens to leave interpretive leeway under Article 63 for other States to adopt, possibly constraining India’s capacity to shape emerging norms of collective responsibility and human rights. Selective participation, by contrast, enables India to join cases that are of interest to it while upholding sovereignty, embodying moral leadership, and making a more nuanced contribution to the development of international law.
Finally, silence is also a kind of speech. India has to balance the compromises between absence and calibrated presence, taking a gradual, responsive, and intelligence-driven approach to unfolding interventions. Continued abstention protects flexibility but undermines its claim to moral leadership. Participation would involve risk but also promise: the chance to leave an imprint on the collective interpretation of humanity’s most sacred treaty. In a world where silence is a position, India must decide whether it wishes to stand outside or shape the architecture of justice.
(This post has been authored by Shashyak Roy and Kavya Sinha, second-year students at WBNUJS, Kolkata)
CITE AS: Shashyak Roy and Kavya Sinha, ‘Interventions Before the ICJ: From Restraint to Normative Multilateralism’ (The Contemporary Law Forum, 26 December 2025) <https://tclf.in/2025/12/26/interventions-before-the-icj-from-restraint-to-normative-multilateralism/> date of access.