Introduction

Indian metropolitan cities have seen the rise in unitary families in the past 25 years, but the support systems for the elderly have not developed at the same pace. With this aim of protecting the ageing population in India, the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) was enacted. The Act provides for maintenance claims and protection against neglect or abuse. The Act established the Maintenance Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal for addressing these claims.

The Maintenance Tribunal has the power to order children or relatives of the elderly to pay a monthly allowance for maintenance, including necessities like food, clothing, residence, and medical care. While the Appellate Tribunal has the power to hear appeals from the Maintenance Tribunal. Clause 1 of Section 16 of the Act, which confers jurisdiction on the Appellate Tribunal, reads as:

Any senior citizen or a parent, as the case may be, aggrieved by an order of a Tribunal may, within sixty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal…

On the face of it, the language employed by the legislature might seem plain and simple. However, by using the phrase ‘senior citizen or a parent’, it has created two distinct classes of aggrieved persons, i.e., senior citizens or Parents, and children or relatives who are ordered to pay maintenance.

The courts across the country are divided on the question of whether this right of appeal can be exercised only by a senior citizen or parent, or whether it extends to any aggrieved party. The question assumes importance because if the right is exclusively with senior citizens, then children or relatives against whom orders are passed cannot appeal to the Appellate Tribunal and need to invoke the review jurisdiction of the High Courts directly. On the other hand, if any person aggrieved can appeal, the appellate powers become wider.

Divergent Judicial Opinions

The Expansive View: Right to Appeal for All Parties

The expansive view of the provision was first propounded by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Paramjit Kumar Saroya v. Union of India, wherein it held that Section 16(1) must be read purposively. Denying the right to appeal to one side, while granting it to the other, would create disharmony. It further stated that the provision fails to mention, rather than intentionally excludes, the other side from appealing the order. The court provided two reasons for adopting this expansive view of the provision:

Firstly, the proviso to Section 16(1) of the Act states that the pendency of an appeal will not come in the way of the children or any relative who is required to pay any amount in terms of any such order to continue to pay the amount. The question of staying the order of payment would arise only when the children or a relative files the appeal.

Secondly, Section 16(2) of the Act requires that the notice of appeal be served upon the respondent. If Section 16(1) had only envisaged the filing of an appeal by a senior citizen or a parent, then Section 16(2) of the Act would have used the term child or any other party rather than ‘respondent’.

Multiple High Courts later followed the reasoning of Saroya in catena of judgments, including Madras High Court in Balamurugan v. Rukmani, Allahabad High Court in Akhilesh Kumar v. State of U.P., and Bombay High Court in Jagdish Pitamber Pawar v. Pitamber Pundalik Pawar.

The Restrictive View: Appeal Limited to Senior Citizens and Parents

The restrictive view maintains that the right of appeal is limited to senior citizens and parents, as elucidated under Section 16(1). The Calcutta High Court in Mamta Sakri v. State of West Bengal held that the wording of Section 16 is simple and lucid; therefore, purposive interpretation should not be invoked. The clear language leaves no scope for reading into it any additional category of appellants. The same line of reasoning was adopted by the Madras High Court in K. Raju v. Union of India, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Shilpi v. Shakuntla, and the Karnataka High Court in K. Lokesh v/s Bangalore District Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Appellate Tribunal.

Analysis

On closer examination, the reasoning of the court in the Saroya case falls into a pitfall because of the court’s fallacious assumptions. The court wrongly assumes that a senior citizen or parent would not file an appeal against the maintenance order, and by working on this faulty assumption, it reaches on the conclusion that the question of staying the order of payment would arise only when the children or a relative files the appeal. Therefore, the proviso of Section 16(1) of the Act permits the children or a relative to file an appeal against the order passed by the Maintenance Tribunal. However, the court fails to envisage the situation wherein a maintenance order has been passed in favour of a senior citizen or parent, but he/she is not satisfied with that order and challenges it in the Appellate Tribunal. This highlights the gap in the court’s assumption that the question of interfering with the maintenance order would only arise when the children or a relative files the appeal.

Moreover, the proviso is a safeguard in favour of a senior citizen or a parent, which should be interpreted to mean that the pendency of the appeal would not discharge the obligation to pay the maintenance from children or a relative. Even if a senior citizen or parent challenges the appeal, it would not automatically render the order of the Maintenance Tribunal inoperative.

The second reason given by the Saroya case finds some merit when viewed in isolation. Another line of reasoning in favour of expansive interpretation, which originated in the Saroya case, was based on Section 16(5) of the Act, which gives finality to the Appellate Tribunal’s order. The provision follows the principle of audi alteram partem, which requires that every party should be given an opportunity to be heard. The court reasoned that if only one party is given the right to appeal, the order cannot achieve finality because it will be qua the rights of the appealing party only. However, the court here wrongly inter-twined two substantive rights, i.e., the right to be heard, and the right to appeal. The court inferred that the right to be heard automatically translates into the right to appeal. However, Section 16(5) of the Act confers the right to be heard only after an appeal has been filed by a senior citizen or a parent. After the Appellate Tribunal has accepted an appeal application, the other party should be heard before passing any order based on the grounds of appeal. Right to be heard and right to appeal do not go hand in hand; rather, the former comes into play only after the latter has been exercised.

Moreover, the catena of Supreme Court judgments have established that the right to appeal is a statutory right, not an absolute one. The courts cannot grant the right to appeal if the legislature intentionally omitted to do so.

The maxim Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius clearly states that when a provision expressly mentions one thing, it implies exclusion of others. On the plain reading of Section 16(1) of the Act, inference can be drawn that the legislature has restricted the right of appeal only to one party by using the term ‘senior citizen or parent’. The doctrinal question that arises is whether the harmonious interpretation can be allowed to supply the casus omissus to the provision. Can courts be permitted to re-write the words of Section 16(1) of the Act under the guise of purposive/harmonious interpretation?

In the present case, the argument of harmonious interpretation could be advanced from both the sides. Proponents of the restrictive approach could argue that the Act is a social legislation enacted with the purpose of providing fast and summary relief and securing the constitutional promise of a dignified existence to the elderly. Limiting the right of appeal only to the senior citizens or a parent furthers this purpose, as it reduces the interference with Maintenance Tribunal’s orders. The right of appeal is conferred on people that the act seeks to protect, not on people against whom the protection is sought.

Proponents of expansive approach could argue that to give effect to the proviso of Section 16(1) of the Act, and reconcile the proviso with the sub-section, the right to appeal needs to be conferred on both the parties. Applying the Mischief rule of Heydon’s Case, which states that courts may adopt an interpretation that suppresses the mischief and advances the remedy, the right to appeal be conferred on all aggrieved parties.

Conclusion

A closer look reveals that the debate around the Section 16(1) of the Act does not emanate from the loose wording of provision, but from the application of different principles of statutory interpretation. The restrictive view aligns the provision with the objective of the Act, while the expansive approach relies on the principle of harmonious interpretation to give full effect to other provisions of the Act. However, the principles of harmonious interpretation cannot fill the Lacuna left by legislature, as it would go beyond the interpretation of statutes to altering and amending the text of the provision. It would be illegitimate for the court to substitute the choice of legislature with its own and fill in the shoes of legislature.

On both the bare reading of Section 16(1) of the Act and the application of principles of statutory interpretation, the more correct position appears to be that the provision confers the right of appeal exclusively on senior citizens or a parent. The expansion of the ambit of provision must come through the amendment rather than judicial ruling.

(This post has been authored by Simran Sidhu, third year BALLB student at Nalsar University of Law, Hyderabad.)

CITE AS: Simran Sidhu, ‘Harmonious Interpretation or Judicial Overreach? The Scope of Appellate Rights of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007’ (The Contemporary Law Forum, 25 April 2026) <https://tclf.in/2026/04/25/when-scarcity-meets-silence-indias-failing-war-on-hoarding/> date of access.