Introduction
Res Gestae, a latin term meaning “things done” is legally implied u/s 4 of the Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (“BSA”). From Gentela Vijayavardhan Rao to Sukhar , the Indian judiciary had laid down the principles of res gestae. Judicial interpretations and scholarly opinions have distilled four key tests for determining whether facts form part of the same transaction: (a) Cause and effect; (b) Contemporaneous occurrence at the same place; (c) Spontaneous occurrence at the same time; and (d) A common purpose or design. It rests on the assumption that statements made in the heat of the moment are inherently trustworthy due to their spontaneity and emotional immediacy, and hence, minimises the risk of fabrication. This article attempts to question the premise behind this assumption based on the recent developments in neuroscience.
To interpret this concept, we often look to English law, particularly the doctrine of res gestae. In England and Wales (“E&W”), res gestae is governed by Section 118(1)(4)(a) of the Criminal Justice Act, 2003. The exception permits statements made under overwhelming emotional stress where the risk of concoction is deemed negligible, as defined in Andrews, which mandates the statement be an “instinctive reaction” to a dominating event with no real opportunity for reasoned reflection. Nevertheless, it faces criticism for its reliance on outdated psychological assumptions, notably the unproven premise that stress precludes fabrication. Critics like David Ormerod argue spontaneity does not guarantee truthfulness, as heightened emotions may distort memory or induce false statements, while the Law Commission’s retention of res gestae in 1997, after its recommendation to abolish res gestae in 1995, despite its weak theoretical foundations highlights inconsistencies, particularly when contrasted with the abolition of “dying declarations.”
Similarly, in the US, the exception “excited utterance” under Rule 803 (2) of Federal Rules of Evidence, limited by the confrontation clause, admits statements made under the stress of a startling event. This admissibility is rooted in 19th century scholar John Henry Wigmore’s rationale that excitement stifles fabrication. Unlike E&W which mandates independent proof of the event, the US law allows the statement itself to self-authenticate the event without external corroboration, and hence prioritises spontaneity over contemporaneity. However, psychological research shows stress may distort memory or enable rapid fabrication, undermining Wigmore’s assumptions, while scholars like Mueller critique the “excited men don’t lie” analogy.
Even though there are some differences between Indian, UK, and US concept of res gestae, the requirements of contemporaneity and spontaneity inches India closer to both UK and USA. Hence, the criticisms pertaining to US and UK squarely apply to India as well.
Therefore, heavily relying on the doctrine of res gestae evidence in India can be challenged on two prominent grounds – (a) Critiques from Neuroscience; and (b) Contrast with evolving Indian legal standards in trauma responses.
Critiques from Neuroscience
It is contended that the judges should not be bound by the orthodox understanding and should be allowed with proper considerations to the modern scientific and philosophical understanding. This is because human perception and memory, as highlighted by Reisberg, are selective and reconstructive, often blending real and imagined elements, making confident recollections potentially inaccurate—especially under emotional stress, which may enhance central details but impair peripheral ones. This challenges legal assumptions about the reliability of emotionally charged statements, such as res gestae or excited utterances. Neuroscientific findings, including those by Prof. Amy Arnsten, show that high stress disrupts memory encoding, casting doubt on the spontaneity and accuracy of such statements. Legal scholars like Hohmeier and Williams critique the excited utterance exception, noting that stress does not necessarily inhibit fabrication. Here are some more arguments based on the principles of neuroscience that undermines the reliability of res gestae:
The neurocognitive dynamics of truth-telling v. Lying
Neuroscientific studies challenge traditional legal assumptions about the reliability of emotionally charged statements. Spence’s research reveals that lying in non-stressful contexts takes approximately 0.2 seconds longer than truth-telling, a delay linked to the cognitive effort of suppressing truthful information and managing deception. This aligns with cases like People v. Simpson, where a declarant fabricated details during a high stress 911 call. Spence emphasizes that deception engages executive functions, particularly the prefrontal cortex (“PFC”), which oversees complex tasks like response monitoring and emotional regulation. However, these findings primarily address sustained deception like interrogations, leaving open questions about brief, spontaneous lies uttered during acute stress.
Prefrontal cortex inhibition and enhanced deception under stress
Karim’s study provides critical insights into the neural mechanisms of lying. By inhibiting the anterior prefrontal cortex (“aPFC”) via transcranial direct current stimulation (“tDCS”), subjects exhibited faster reaction times for lying, reduced guilt, and improved deceptive performance. This suggests that suppressing the aPFC, a region associated with moral reasoning and impulse control, facilitates more effective lying. Crucially, acute stress similarly impairs PFC function, as Arnsten notes that stress rapidly degrades higher order cognitive abilities, shifting behavioural control to primitive brain circuits optimized for survival. This neurobiological response implies that stress may not inhibit lying but could instead enhance it by disinhibiting deceptive behaviours.
Stress, PFC dysfunction, and legal implications
Under acute stress, the PFC’s capacity for inhibitory control and rational decision making diminishes, potentially heightening the likelihood of rapid, instinctive lies. Arnsten clarifies that while the PFC may recover within minutes post-stress, the immediate aftermath of a traumatic event leaves individuals neurologically predisposed to reactive, unmediated responses. This undermines the legal premise that emotionally overpowered statements are inherently trustworthy due to spontaneity. Instead, stress-induced PFC impairment may render declarants more adept at lying, as survival instincts like self-preservation override deliberative truth-telling.
Contrast with evolving legal standards in trauma responses
In India, judicial and legislative reforms have increasingly acknowledged the complex psychological impact of trauma on survivors, particularly in sexual assault cases. For instance, the Nirbhaya case and its aftermath catalysed amendments to criminal law, including the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, which introduced trauma-informed procedures such as in-camera trials, victim anonymity, and restrictions on cross examination about a survivor’s prior sexual history. The Supreme Court, in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, emphasized that delays in reporting sexual assault should not automatically discredit survivors, recognizing that trauma can manifest as silence, confusion, or dissociation. Similarly, in P.Rathinam v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Supreme Court affirmed that survivors’ testimonies may be fragmented or delayed due to psychological distress, aligning with global neuroscientific understanding of stress and memory.
Despite these advancements, BSA retains the res gestae doctrine, which permits spontaneous statements made during a startling event to be admitted as evidence. Courts often rely on this exception, where witnesses’ immediate reactions are deemed inherently reliable. However, this contradicts modern neuroscientific insights, highlighted in cases like People v. Simpson, that stress can impair truthful recall or even facilitate rapid fabrication.
This creates a paradox, while Indian courts now contextualize delayed reporting and erratic behaviour in sexual assault cases, they simultaneously uphold res gestae as a rigid exception, ignoring how acute stress might compromise declarant reliability.
Recommendations
Considering such drawbacks of the res geastea doctrine, more cautious approach to res gestae evidence is suggested. Firstly, the Indian courts while interpreting the section have placed an over-reliance on the principles of UK and USA and have deviated from the principles established by the act. The sole test that is carved out by the section is that the facts should pertain to the same transaction. The principle of the section is straightforward. It posits that the connected facts when form the part of same transaction as the fact in issue should not be excluded so as to have a holistic view. The factor of time and place, a crucial indicator of spontaneity and contemporaneity, is not paramount as the section itself provides for actions occurring at different places and times. The section takes an independent view from the ‘contemporaneous’ view of UK and the ‘spontaneous’ view of USA and advocates for unity in action which boils down to the facts forming part of the same transaction. The time and place are not negligible factors to ascertain same transaction, ascertainment of which lies on the discretion of judge and the ‘mental circle’ in the minds of the judge highlighting the unity actions or connection of facts pertinent in each case. Therefore, reliance on unity of action and restricting to facts forming part of the same transaction will limit the scope of misinterpretation and misuse.
Secondly, the court time and again has alienated from the structure envisioned by Stephen for the Evidence act (by extension to the BSA) and deviated from the connotations flowing from it. The act is differentiated in the broad connotations of relevancy, admissibility, proof and evidence. Under Stephen’s scheme, relevancy pertains to facts and admissibility pertains to evidence. Section 4 falls within the chapter of relevancy and therefore to ascertain its evidentiary value or its admissibility, which reflects the courts’ observed approach, is arguably misplaced. Admissibility, where judicial discretion is paramount, decides whether relevant fact to be admitted in the proceedings of the court and to count it as evidence and venture to answer the fact in issue.
The section does not place any limitations to ‘evidentiary’ use of relevant statement made admissible and therefore the debate of the veracity of the statements does not arise. Therefore, the structure envisioned in the act must be followed so that facts forming part of same transaction are understood merely as relevant, contributing to ascertain a holistic view of the factual matrix and not as admissible which should depend on the sensibilities and discretion of the judges exercised uniquely each pertaining to the unique facts of the case.
These corrective measures will ensure that the perils of misinterpretation and over-reliance placed on the practices of UK and US, especially in the light of advanced scientific and neurological advancements will be mitigated.
(This post has been authored by Tatva Damania, a student at Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai, and Shrushti Taori, a student at Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur.)
CITE AS: Tatva Damania and Shrushti Taori, ‘NEUROSCIENCE V. RES GESTAE: CAN THE COURTS RELY ON THE UNRELIABLE MIND?’ (The Contemporary Law Forum, 22 May 2025) <https://tclf.in/2025/05/22/neuroscience-v-res-gestae-can-the-courts-rely-on-the-unreliable-mind/>date of access.