Introduction
The recent Supreme Court judgment in All India Judges Association v. Union of India on the eligibility of law graduates for appearing in the examination for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) is garnering headlines for all the right reasons. This judgment has impacted the futures of lakhs of law students and graduates. While some argue that a foundational understanding of courtroom procedures and practical knowledge of the profession can only be acquired through at least three years of legal practice, others argue that 3-year or 5-year programmes of law schools, though not necessarily in their current form, are capable of imparting practical knowledge through their mandatory internship criteria. Nonetheless, the three-judge bench mandated the requirement of a minimum three years of practice in the courts.
The exclusion of fresh law graduates from eligibility, does not, in itself, render the judgment irrational. However, the decision has been undertaken without analyzing the possible outcomes and consequences, which is a sad state of affairs. A judgment of such profound magnitude, directly affecting the access to a legal career should have been accompanied by a nuanced and long-term assessment of its implications. In overlooking the lived realities of aspiring judicial aspirants and the challenges faced by the junior lawyers in the court system, the judgment misses an opportunity to strike a balance between experiential learning and inclusive access to the judiciary.
The Empirical Void
This rule by the Supreme Court suffers from a critical lack of empirical data as to how a 3-year practice would equip the aspirants with enough knowledge and training for them not to remain “raw graduates” (as stated in the judgment). No proper guidelines have been given as to what process should a graduate should be going through or what all learnings need to be undertaken to become experienced enough to stand in the courts after 3 years of training and seek justice. What constitutes “sufficient” practice in those three years has not been defined. The assumption that experience in the bar automatically turns into judicial readiness has not been substantiated by any empirical and practical data. The Court has not clarified the nature of mentorship and the subsequent evaluation framework which the aspiring candidates need to be going through, which leaves a lot of vagueness.
The judgment held that “from the first day of his assuming office, the Judge has to decide, among others, questions of life, liberty, property and reputation of the litigants, to induct graduates fresh from the Universities to occupy seats of such vital powers is neither prudent nor desirable”. However, nowhere has the Court offered any clarification on how the minimum 3 years of working as an advocate would make a candidate worthy of deciding such critical questions of law. No framework or evaluation criteria has been mentioned. Additionally, the Court has also not provided any data to support its conclusion on how freshers appointed as lower court judges have categorically failed to decide such critical questions of law and led to miscarriage of justice.
Certification: Who Watches the Watchers?
One of the most concerning aspects of the judgment is the vague and inconsistent mechanism it proposes for verifying whether a candidate has completed the mandatory three years of practice. The Court notes that in smaller District Courts, judicial officers may certify a candidate’s compliance with the requirement, whereas in metropolitan areas – where the volume of advocates is significantly higher – any advocate with a minimum standing of ten years may issue such a certification. However, the judgment does not define the qualifications, responsibilities, or accountability mechanisms applicable to those certifying the experience. This lack of clarity raises serious questions about uniformity and potential misuse, such as subjective refusals or favouritism and the credibility of the process, especially for first-generation lawyers who do not have any network to look up to.
Such vagueness is all the more prone to misuse as advocates may charge fees or collaborate with coaching centres to issue practice certificates in large numbers. Disturbingly, candidates might never even enter a courtroom yet obtain certificates, which itself defeats the entire purpose of three years of practical experience and the process is rendered counterproductive.
When the evaluation criteria remain unclear, it becomes all the more difficult to reassure judicial aspirants who are fresh graduates. After investing 5 to 6 years of rigorous legal education where students spend lakhs on their fees, they have to gain experience for 3 years when they are underpaid or unpaid. The Bar Council has issued “guidelines” (no strict mandate) to pay ₹20,000 in urban areas and ₹15,000 in rural areas to be paid to junior lawyers with the implementation being flexible based on the financial capabilities of senior advocates and firms. Such a state would make them financially dependent on their families for well over 26-27 years of age, provided exams are conducted on time.
Before mandating a minimum of three years of practice, the Court ought to have given due consideration to essential questions: How will the Court ensure that the candidates are actually practising advocacy and learning the procedures and not just filing vakalatnamas? What should constitute fair remuneration? What standards should govern working hours and conditions? Such fundamental issues warranted comprehensive evaluation before making such a decision that impacts the futures of lakhs of aspiring judicial candidates.
Socio-Economic and Gendered Consequences
Not deciding questions of financial gain has the potential to disproportionately exclude candidates from marginalized communities. Candidates lack familial support of finances, having spent lakhs on legal education. This might discourage those from disadvantaged backgrounds to even think of becoming a judge and might then shift them towards other sectors, leading to a talent drought in the judiciary.
The impact of this decision is not gender neutral either. Women, especially from marginalized and rural communities face the added pressure of “making it” in life. In multiple cases, families allow women to study with the mindset that they will earn after the completion of their studies, but now, how are these women to make their families understand that the system has disadvantaged them where their earning is now delayed by at least 3-4 years? Additionally, legal mentorship in India, especially in tier 2 and 3 cities, is heavily reliant on informal mentorship and networking, which is sometimes operated under old gendered norms, and so women might face bias and sidelining without proper recourse to any redressal mechanism – an aspect overlooked under this judgment.
Lessons from the Law Commission
The Law Commission in its 116th Report (1986) titled “Formation of an All-India Judicial Service” recognized that Bar experience should not be the only path to serving as a judge. It advocated for robust, structured training after recruitment, which would foster the judiciary to be more inclusive and better prepared without automatically disqualifying those who lacked courtroom experience. In addition, the 117th Law Commission Report (1986) titled “Training of Judicial Officer” welcomed the removal of the minimum requirement to practice and instead focused on the post recruitment training. It emphasized on institutional training, both before and during the service, alongside emphasizing the importance of “Continuous in-service exposure”, which is the foundation of a strong judicial system.
Conclusion
The time has come for the Supreme Court to adopt a more inclusive approach when setting entry requirements for judicial officers. The Court should tailor its rules to the backgrounds of individual candidates. Two key factors deserve serious attention: a candidate’s educational qualifications and the length of their practice at the bar.
First, fresh law graduates and seasoned practitioners possess different skill sets. A recent graduate may lack courtroom experience but will bring up-to-date academic knowledge. Conversely, an advocate with ten years at the bar will know court etiquette but may need formal exposure to judicial functions. A one-size-fits-all training regime does not serve either group well.
Second, the Law Commission of India has proposed sensible training durations. Under its plan, a fresh graduate would undergo one to two years of formal judicial training. An experienced practitioner would receive three to six months of instruction. This graduated model ensures that each candidate receives the precise preparation they need. It also eases the transition from advocate to judge.
Third, placing the onus on institutional mechanisms promotes fairness. Candidates should not be expected to master every facet of judicial work before they join the service. Instead, academies and training centers can shoulder that burden. They can offer courses in writing judgments, managing case flow, and upholding standards of impartiality. They can also teach niche areas of law, such as those of cybercrime and environmental disputes.
Fourth, adopting a well-structured training program would highly advance the quality of justice. Judges who are trained under a standard institutional curriculum will apply consistent reasoning. Their judgments will be clearer and more predictable. Litigants will have greater confidence in the judicial process.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s recognition of these proposals would demonstrate its commitment to access to justice. It would show that the Court values both fresh talent and experienced insight. It would also affirm that the judiciary stands ready to equip its officers with all the necessary tools. However, the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court fails to address these much-needed reforms towards a flexible, background-sensitive training regime for judicial officers.
(This post has been authored by Awaneesh Kumar and Tanya Gangwar, students at Gujarat National Law University, Gandhinagar)
CITE AS: Awaneesh Kumar and Tanya Gangwar, ‘3 Years of Experience: A Complex Mandate, Lightly Reasoned’ (The Contemporary Law Forum, 10 June 2025 <https://tclf.in/2025/06/10/3-years-of-experience-a-complex-mandate-lightly-reasoned/>date of access.