Whose pain counts: Gendered application of Cruelty

The most important feature of cruelty doctrine is not that it is vague, but that it asks judges to decide what counts as an ordinary marriage. Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act and Section 85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita never define mental cruelty exhaustively. Instead, courts are asked to distinguish actionable harm from the “ordinary wear and tear” of married life. That delegation appears neutral, but it quietly raises a prior question: whose ordinary life becomes the legal baseline? This article argues that cruelty doctrine is applied through a gendered comparator. The asymmetry is not that courts always protect men and ignore women, there are important counterexamples, but that women’s experiences of humiliation are more readily normalised as marital endurance, while comparable injuries suffered by men are more readily recognised as cruelty.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that cruelty is contextual. In N.G. Dastane v. S. Dastane, it rejected a rigid objective test and held that it is to be proved on a civil standard of probabilities. Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh later directed courts to assess the cumulative effect of conduct rather than isolated incidents. Cruelty is therefore an evaluative doctrine. Feminist legal theorist Nicola Lacey argues that law’s apparent neutrality often conceals an unstated “standard subject” whose experiences define legal reasonableness. Pierre Bourdieu makes a similar point that domination persists not merely through force but through the normalisation of social hierarchies. Cruelty doctrine reveals both ideas in practice. The question is not whether courts recognise mental harm, they do, but which mental harms are treated as ordinary enough to disappear into marriage itself.

One word, two functions

As a ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA, cruelty is gender neutral and read expansively on a balance of probabilities. As a crime under BNS Sections 85 and 86 (formerly Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code), it is defined narrowly, protects only a married woman against her husband or his relatives, and requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. These two provisions were designed for different purposes, one to dissolve a marriage, the other to punish an offence, yet courts have increasingly folded the criminal provision back into the civil one. A provision meant as a shield against dowry violence has, in a significant number of cases, become evidence of the very cruelty it was designed to punish. That is not a flaw in either statute individually. It is a product of asking one word, cruelty, to do civil and criminal work at the same time.

Yet courts move between the two, most visibly where a failed criminal complaint is itself held to be mental cruelty. The Calcutta High Court held that a prosecution on a false statement by either spouse can be mental cruelty, and a 2023 Karnataka High Court decision counted a wife’s litigation against her husband’s family together with baseless infidelity allegations. A shield against dowry violence thus becomes, in a number of reported cases, evidence of the cruelty it was meant to punish. Because only wives can invoke the criminal provision, only husbands can turn its failure into a civil ground. The asymmetry is built into the drafting.

The two functions should be kept apart. Persistent refusal of intercourse without reasonable cause justifies divorce, as the Supreme Court reiterated in S.T. v. V.S. (2026 INSC 620), but it should not be a crime, since a spouse retains sexual autonomy. What additional element (gravity of harm, culpability, coercion) turns a private wrong into a public one is a question the drafting leaves open, and a gendered baseline fills that space.

BNS Section 85 punishes cruelty; Section 86 defines it as wilful conduct likely to drive a woman to suicide or cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (mental or physical), or as harassment to coerce an unlawful demand for property. Three features invite uneven application. First, the first limb is a standard, not a rule: “wilful”, “likely” and “grave” do not say which humiliations qualify, so judges import civil ideas of wear and tear. In Digambar v. State of Maharashtra (2024) the Court held that a bare allegation of cruelty is no offence without intent to cause grave injury or drive the victim to suicide. Second, the second limb is tied to property demands, so taunts about complexion or infertility must clear the “grave injury” threshold, where they are readily reclassified as ordinary. Third, the offence protects only wives while the civil ground is gender neutral, so the two cannot operate as a matched pair. Where complaints plead sweeping narratives rather than the statutory ingredients, courts quash them as vague, as in Dara Lakshmi Narayana (2024 INSC 953) and Geddam Jhansi (2025).

The baseline: whose humiliation is ordinary

The Supreme Court quashed Section 498A proceedings against a woman’s in-laws, observing that the complaint had been filed with an “oblique purpose” and that “a few taunts here and there” are part of everybody’s life. The statement is striking because it does not deny that taunts occurred, it reclassifies them as ordinary family existence. The same reasoning appears in different Courts. Taunts about a wife’s complexion, her infertility, her failure to bring sufficient gifts, being made to sleep on a carpet and barred from visiting neighbours or a temple unaccompanied were all considered domestic discord, all of it.

A caveat is needed. Many quashing decisions turn on omnibus allegations against relatives (2025 INSC 803; 2026 INSC 212). In Prasanta Kumar Dhar v. State of West Bengal (2026 INSC 1087) the Court quashed the case against the parents-in-law but left specific allegations against the husband untouched. That is principled screening, not evidence of a gendered baseline, which operates where a court accepts the conduct as alleged and then classifies it.

Now compare cases brought by husbands. It was held that a wife’s repeated taunts about her husband’s financial limitations constituted mental cruelty. The Court emphasised that each individual remark appeared trivial, but cumulatively disrupted his “mental equilibrium”, precisely the Samar Ghosh framework. Likewise, it held that humiliating an unemployed husband during the financial vulnerability created by the COVID-19 pandemic amounted to mental cruelty.

The contrast is revealing. Both categories involve identity-based humiliation. Yet the husband’s earning capacity is treated as central to his dignity, whereas the wife’s body, her complexion, fertility, or desirability, is often absorbed into the expected burdens of marriage. The comparator is therefore gendered, men’s humiliation becomes psychological injury; women’s humiliation becomes domestic friction. More substantively, courts have repeatedly held that a wife’s insistence on living separately from her in-laws may itself constitute cruelty. Narendra v. K. Meena established this principle, and Monika Tamrakar v. Prashant Kumar Tamrakar explicitly weighed a wife’s conduct against “Indian joint family values”.

Importantly, the doctrine does not compel this result. In Roopa Soni v. Kamalnarayan Soni, the Supreme Court expressly recognised that what constitutes cruelty for a woman may differ from cruelty for a man and called for a more elastic approach where wives seek relief. In Hirendra Kushwaha, the Allahabad High Court concluded that the exchange of insults was “not unilateral”; both spouses appeared to be victim and offender. Formally, this is symmetrical. Practically, it neutralises the party who invoked legal protection. The complaint ceases to describe injury and becomes evidence of mutual incompatibility. In January 2026 the Jharkhand High Court granted a wife divorce after her husband took private photographs from her cloud storage and showed them to relatives. A gender-sensitive baseline exists; its inconsistent use is the problem. The possibility of a gender-sensitive comparator already exists within precedent; its inconsistent use is precisely the problem. The joint household is assumed natural, so a wife’s wish for an independent one reads as disruption rather than autonomy. Again, the law is not uniform. In Jyotish Chandra Thapliyal v. Deveshwari Thapliyal, the Court refused to treat failure to care for in-laws as cruelty where the husband had himself chosen to live separately. These decisions illustrate that courts are entirely capable of placing dignity above familial conformity.

Credibility: the presumption of a disinterested narrator

Cruelty cases often turn less on what happened than on whose account is believed and courts have grown wary of exaggerated allegations. In Rajesh Chaddha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court acquitted after finding the wife’s testimony insufficiently corroborated and criticised the tendency to implicate every relative of the husband. Similar reasoning appears in Ghanshyam Soni v. State (NCT of Delhi), where allegations failed because they were considered omnibus, and in Jayesh Kanna v. Assistant Commissioner, where oral testimony alone was held inadequate.

Judicial caution against wrongful prosecution is legitimate. But the asymmetry emerges when compared with cases involving husbands’ testimony. In Jitendra Kumar Srivastava v. Sweta Srivastava, the husband’s uncontested claim that his wife confined him to a separate room was accepted in ex parte proceedings, and his father’s testimony was treated as the most natural evidence of events occurring within the household. The civil standard of proof was applied without demanding independent corroboration. These cases demonstrate that evidentiary rules are sufficiently flexible to protect either spouse. The gendered inconsistency arises from judicial assumptions about credibility rather than from procedural necessity.

The obvious objection is that one line of cases is criminal while the other is civil. Yet the distinction does not fully explain the pattern. The Kerala High Court in Praveen Kumar v. State of Kerala upheld a Section 498A conviction despite delay, describing matrimonial cruelty as a continuing offence and warning against hyper-technical scrutiny of a victim’s testimony. Acquittal rates cannot settle the question either: commentators such as Indira Jaising and Flavia Agnes argue that low conviction rates also reflect complainants turning hostile under pressure to settle, and settled cases closed as “false”. The point is narrower than misuse or bias: where evidence is thin, the benefit of the doubt does not fall evenly.

Conclusion

The significance of these counterexamples is methodological. They refute the claim that Indian courts are indifferent to women. The doctrine protects women when judges refuse to reason from a single standard subject. That makes the inconsistency harder to defend, because nothing in Dastane, Samar Ghosh, or the statutory text requires taunts about complexion or infertility to be treated as ordinary while taunts about masculinity or earning capacity become cruelty. This sample cannot show how often that happens, only that it recurs. The constitutional vision articulated in Navtej Singh Johar and Shafin Jahan moved dignity and autonomy in intimate life and marriage is now a legal relationship governed by equality. The question is not whether every quarrel should become litigation, but whether courts recognise cumulative humiliation consistently across genders. When a woman’s body, fertility or isolation is called wear and tear, the law is not merely declining to intervene; it is defining those injuries as the expected conditions of marriage. The gendered application of cruelty lies there: in the ordinary life judges imagine when they decide whose pain counts.

(This post has been authored by Sandhyashree Karanth, a fourth-year B.A.LL.B. (Hons.) student at RV University) 

CITE AS: Sandhyashree Karanth, ‘Whose pain counts: Gendered application of Cruelty’ (The Contemporary Law Forum, 16 November 2026) <https://tclf.in/2026/11/16/whose-pain-counts-gendered-application-of-cruelty/> date of access.

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