![THE CONTEMPORARY LAW FORUM](data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="440" height="87"><rect width="100%" height="100%"><animate attributeName="fill" values="rgba(153,153,153,0.5);rgba(153,153,153,0.1);rgba(153,153,153,0.5)" dur="2s" repeatCount="indefinite" /></rect></svg>)
![](data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="440" height="123"><rect width="100%" height="100%"><animate attributeName="fill" values="rgba(153,153,153,0.5);rgba(153,153,153,0.1);rgba(153,153,153,0.5)" dur="2s" repeatCount="indefinite" /></rect></svg>)
![](data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="1024" height="577"><rect width="100%" height="100%"><animate attributeName="fill" values="rgba(153,153,153,0.5);rgba(153,153,153,0.1);rgba(153,153,153,0.5)" dur="2s" repeatCount="indefinite" /></rect></svg>)
A Flawed Exchange Board: The Need For Reforms In SEBI Part-II
In this part of the piece, the author argues about the power dynamics in SEBI and how can procedural flaws can be fixed by giving an internal revamp.
Investment Law
A Flawed Exchange Board: The Need For Reforms In SEBI Part-I
In this part of the piece, the author analyses the flaws in the Insider Trading norms of the Securities Exchange Board of India while exploring statutory limitations on SEBI while investigating such offenses.
![India Mandatory Arbitration Mutual Agreement OECD](data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="486" height="273"><rect width="100%" height="100%"><animate attributeName="fill" values="rgba(153,153,153,0.5);rgba(153,153,153,0.1);rgba(153,153,153,0.5)" dur="2s" repeatCount="indefinite" /></rect></svg>)
Mutual Agreement Procedure vs. Mandatory Binding Arbitration: India’s Stance on Non-Judicial Remedies in DTAAs
In this post, the authors aim to scrutinise the Indian stance on non-judicial remedies of bilateral tax treaties. In doing so, the authors analyse the particulars of Mutual Agreement Procedures and Mandatory Binding Arbitrations, in the context of Indian reservations and OECD recommendations.
![Kshama Loya : India's Investment Arbitration](data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="480" height="360"><rect width="100%" height="100%"><animate attributeName="fill" values="rgba(153,153,153,0.5);rgba(153,153,153,0.1);rgba(153,153,153,0.5)" dur="2s" repeatCount="indefinite" /></rect></svg>)
TCLF ONE-ON-ONE| Ep. 19 ft. Kshama Loya : India’s Investment Arbitration & the Vodafone-Cairn Cases
In this episode of TCLF One-on-One, Kshama A. Loya, Leader of International Commercial & Investment Arbitration, Nishith Desai Associates, talks about the recent Vodafone-Cairn cases.
![SEBI](data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="660" height="450"><rect width="100%" height="100%"><animate attributeName="fill" values="rgba(153,153,153,0.5);rgba(153,153,153,0.1);rgba(153,153,153,0.5)" dur="2s" repeatCount="indefinite" /></rect></svg>)
Beware Proxy Advisers! The Big Brother is Watching: Key Issues with SEBI’S puzzling Guidelines for Proxy Advisers
In this post, the author argues that the recent SEBI Procedural Guidelines may undermine the liberty of the businesses’ voting advice and establish formidable barriers to entry for new firms. The author also contends that the broadcast of confidential information (i.e. research methods and techniques) by proxy advisers would destroy their business model.