Introduction

The Indian Constitution delineates a federal structure where both the Union and State governments operate within their respective domains. The role of the Governor, as the constitutional head of a state, is pivotal in maintaining this balance. However, the recent standoff between the Tamil Nadu government and Governor R.N. Ravi, culminating in the Supreme Court’s intervention, underscores the complexities inherent in this arrangement.

In a landmark decision on April 8, 2025, the Supreme Court of India addressed the constitutional crisis stemming from Tamil Nadu Governor R.N. Ravi’s prolonged inaction and subsequent reservation of ten state bills for presidential consideration. The Court’s ruling clarified the extent of gubernatorial discretion under Article 200 of the Constitution, emphasizing the principles of federalism and parliamentary democracy. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the judgment, exploring its constitutional and administrative law implications.​

Between November 2020 and April 2023, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed thirteen bills. Governor Ravi withheld assent to ten of these bills without providing any communication or justification. Even after the Assembly re-passed these bills without modifications, the Governor neither assented to them nor returned them for reconsideration. Instead, he reserved them for the President’s consideration, prompting the state government to file a writ petition in the Supreme Court.

Facts and Legal Questions

The Supreme Court’s ruling in State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu arose from an unprecedented constitutional standoff between the Tamil Nadu government and Governor R.N. Ravi. The case was triggered by the Governor’s refusal to act on several Bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, despite constitutional provisions that require the Governor to exercise discretion within reasonable limits. The dispute exposed critical ambiguities in the exercise of gubernatorial powers under Article 200 and the larger issue of Centre-State relations in India’s quasi-federal framework.

The conflict began between November 2020 and April 2023, during which the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly passed thirteen Bills on various policy matters, including key legislative proposals concerning education, governance, and local administration. Ten of these Bills were either withheld or indefinitely delayed by Governor R.N. Ravi without any formal communication to the State government. Among these, the most politically sensitive was the Bill seeking to exempt Tamil Nadu from the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) for medical admissions, a long-standing demand of the ruling Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) government. The Tamil Nadu government, led by Chief Minister M.K. Stalin, argued that NEET disproportionately affected students from marginalized backgrounds in the state and undermined Tamil Nadu’s unique model of medical education based on Class XII board examination results. The Tamil Nadu Assembly passed a Bill to opt out of NEET, reflecting the state’s legislative competence over education under Entry 25 of the State List (Seventh Schedule of the Constitution).

The issue escalated when the Tamil Nadu government re-passed the Bills without amendments, a move that, under constitutional convention, should have compelled the Governor to grant assent as per the textual reading of Article 200. However, instead of assenting, the Governor reserved the Bills for the President’s consideration, invoking Article 201. This move sparked a constitutional crisis because the Supreme Court has previously clarified that a Governor cannot reserve a Bill for the President’s assent after the State Legislature has re-passed it without any modifications. Tamil Nadu argued that this was a clear violation of the constitutional scheme and an attempt to subvert the will of an elected Assembly.

The issue was not just about delays but about a broader constitutional breakdown. The Tamil Nadu government contended that the Governor’s actions amounted to an unconstitutional obstruction of governance. Given that Governor Ravi had refused to act on these Bills for over two years without providing reasons, the state argued that this paralysis of the legislative process violated the principles of parliamentary democracy, federalism, and constitutional governance.

Faced with administrative stagnation and an unresolved constitutional impasse, the Tamil Nadu government approached the Supreme Court, invoking Article 32 (which allows citizens and state governments to approach the Supreme Court for enforcement of fundamental rights) and Article 131 (which gives the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction in disputes between states and the Union). The writ petition asked the Court to intervene and:

1. Declare the Governor’s inaction unconstitutional.
2. Direct the Governor to grant assent to the Bills re-passed by the Assembly.
3. Clarify the scope and limits of gubernatorial discretion under Article 200.

The Supreme Court had to address several crucial legal questions in this case. The legal questions that emerged before the Supreme Court were multifaceted:

1. Whether the Governor’s prolonged inaction and indefinite delay in granting assent to Bills violated the Constitution, particularly the scheme of Article 200.
2. Whether the Governor had the power to reserve Bills for the President’s consideration after they had been re-passed by the Legislative Assembly without any amendments.
3. Whether the Governor’s conduct could be subject to judicial scrutiny and whether the Court could lay down timelines to regulate gubernatorial actions.
4. Whether the President, upon receiving reserved Bills, could also indefinitely delay their consideration, and what mechanisms existed to ensure that constitutional processes were not rendered ineffective.

Below is a brief understanding of how each question was argued and dealt with by the Court.

The foremost question was whether a Governor could indefinitely delay assent to a Bill without providing reasons. The Tamil Nadu government argued that while Article 200 grants the Governor certain discretionary powers, these powers must be exercised within a reasonable timeframe to prevent a breakdown of legislative processes. A related issue was whether a Governor could reserve a re-passed Bill for the President’s consideration under Article 201, given that the text of Article 200 explicitly states that after reconsideration by the Legislature, the Governor “shall not withhold assent”.

The case also posed a broader federalism question: To what extent can the Union-appointed Governor intervene in the legislative functions of a state government? Tamil Nadu’s arguments were framed within the larger narrative of Centre-State tensions, particularly in states ruled by opposition parties. The DMK-led government presented the case as an attempt by the Governor, an appointee of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) at the Centre, to undermine the autonomy of a state government that had a clear electoral mandate.

Another critical aspect of the case was the precedent it could set for other states. Tamil Nadu was not the only state where the Governor was accused of delaying legislative assent. Similar confrontations had occurred in West Bengal, Kerala, Punjab, and Maharashtra, where Governors had withheld assent to opposition-led governments’ Bills without clear justification. The Supreme Court, therefore, had to decide whether it could lay down binding timelines for gubernatorial action to prevent future constitutional crises.

This dispute reached the Supreme Court at a moment of heightened political friction between the Union and states, making it a constitutional flashpoint with implications beyond Tamil Nadu. The procedural anomalies, such as withholding assent for extended periods, failing to communicate reasons, and reserving Bills after re-passage, highlighted how unchecked gubernatorial discretion could be used to stall elected governments. By accepting the case, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining not just the legality of the Tamil Nadu Governor’s actions but also setting the contours of the Governor’s role in a federal democracy.

This legal battle was, at its core, a fight over democratic accountability, whether an unelected Governor could unilaterally block the will of a democratically elected Assembly and whether the Supreme Court could step in to enforce constitutional discipline on such actions. The next section will examine how the Court resolved these questions, specifically its interpretation of Article 200, its ruling on timelines, and its clarification of gubernatorial discretion.

The Constitutional Scheme of Gubernatorial Powers and the Role of Article 200

The constitutional framework of India vests executive authority in a complex arrangement between the Union and the States. At the centre of each state’s constitutional machinery lies the office of the Governor, envisaged under Article 153 of the Constitution. The Governor serves as the nominal head of a state, analogous to the President at the Union level. However, the design and function of the office of the Governor have often sparked controversy, especially when weighed against the foundational principle of representative democracy. This ruling has once again turned the spotlight on the constitutional position of the Governor and the scope of their legislative powers, specifically under Article 200 of the Constitution.

Article 154 declares that the executive power of the state shall be vested in the Governor and shall be exercised by them either directly or through officers subordinate to them in accordance with the Constitution. This provision, however, is subject to Article 163, which mandates that the Governor shall act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, except in matters where the Constitution explicitly allows discretion. Articles 153 to 162 together form the chapter on “The Governor,” and it is clear from their textual reading and constitutional practice that the Governor is not an independent decision-making authority but a formal constitutional figurehead whose discretion is significantly limited.

Article 200 lies at the intersection of the Governor’s executive function and the legislative process. It delineates the post-legislative procedure after a Bill has been passed by a State Legislature. Under Article 200, when a Bill is presented to the Governor after passage by the state legislature, they are granted four options: (a) to assent to the Bill, thereby enacting it into law; (b) to withhold assent, effectively vetoing the Bill; (c) to return the Bill (if it is not a Money Bill) to the Legislative Assembly with a request for reconsideration; and (d) to reserve the Bill for the President’s consideration, which then invokes Article 201. Each of these options appears on paper to offer the Governor meaningful discretion, but in practice, this discretion is constrained both by constitutional conventions and the principle of responsible government.

The Constitution does not prescribe a time frame within which the Governor must act under Article 200. This silence, while perhaps a deliberate choice by the framers to preserve some flexibility, has turned into a structural loophole that enables Governors to sit indefinitely on Bills passed by democratically elected state legislatures. This becomes especially problematic in a quasi-federal system like India’s, where political divergence between the Union and state governments is not only common but constitutionally protected. When Governors delay action on critical legislative proposals without justification, the fine balance of legislative authority between the legislature and the executive, as well as between the state and the Centre, is disturbed.

The Constituent Assembly Debates offer some clarity on the intent behind such powers. Members like Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar and KM Munshi emphasized that the Governor must act in accordance with ministerial advice in all but exceptional situations. The power to reserve a Bill was intended as a safeguard in exceptional constitutional cases, such as where a state law may be in conflict with a Union law under Article 254, or where the law implicates national interest or affects fundamental rights. It was not designed to be used as a regular instrument of delay or partisan obstruction.

Yet, historical practice shows that Governors have frequently used this ambiguity to frustrate the will of state legislatures. In politically charged contexts, such as in Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, or Maharashtra, Governors have exercised their power under Article 200 in a manner that appears to defy the settled principles of parliamentary democracy. This pattern has created a recurring constitutional crisis, wherein the unelected head of state withholds or delays assent to legislation passed by the elected Assembly, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the democratic process itself.

Thus, the scheme under Article 200 is neither unlimited nor inviolable. It is guided by constitutional morality, the conventions of responsible governance, and the overarching requirement of acting within a reasonable timeframe. However, the lack of a defined time period in the text of Article 200 has rendered the scheme vulnerable to manipulation, as was evident in the conduct of the Governor of Tamil Nadu who withheld assent to multiple state Bills over several years without justification or communication. The result was not only administrative paralysis but also a confrontation that threatened the federal equilibrium.

The Supreme Court’s recent intervention becomes significant in this light, not merely because it sets timelines but because it restores the equilibrium between constitutional form and democratic substance. The judgment fills the interpretive void left by Article 200 by aligning gubernatorial discretion with constitutional accountability. As the subsequent sections of this article will elaborate, this case is not only about the interpretation of one article but about reasserting the foundational principles of democratic governance and constitutional restraint within India’s federal structure.

Judicial Interpretation: Reading Reasonableness and Timelines into Article 200

The Supreme Court’s intervention was necessitated by a jurisprudential vacuum: Article 200 outlines four discrete courses of action available to a Governor when a Bill is presented for assent, granting assent, withholding it, returning the Bill (if not a money Bill), or reserving it for the President. However, the text is conspicuously silent on the timeframe within which these actions must be taken. This textual silence, long viewed as a constitutional grey area, had created scope for indefinite delays, thereby distorting the balance of powers between the executive and the legislature in a parliamentary democracy.

The Supreme Court addressed this lacuna with a purposive and structural interpretation of the Constitution. It held that while Article 200 does not explicitly stipulate timelines, its operation must be governed by the overarching constitutional principle of reasonableness. The Court emphasized that constitutional functionaries, especially those in unelected offices such as the Governor, are not permitted to act arbitrarily or stall the democratic process through inaction. By importing the doctrine of constitutional trust and accountability, the Court interpreted Article 200 in a manner that upheld both the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

Drawing from precedent and comparative constitutional jurisprudence, the Court reasoned that just because the Constitution does not fix a deadline does not imply that constitutional discretion is unbounded. Relying on the theory of implied limitations and the doctrine of constitutional silence, the Court reaffirmed that powers conferred without explicit limits must still adhere to principles of good faith, expediency, and non-arbitrariness. The Governor, as a constitutional figurehead, is bound to act on the advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 163, except in narrowly defined discretionary domains. The power under Article 200 is not one such area of untrammelled discretion.

In this context, the Court laid down a set of timelines, not by way of amending the Constitution but as a judicial gloss to ensure effective implementation of constitutional provisions. These timelines were:

• Within one month: The Governor must either assent to the Bill or reserve it for the President (where advised by the Council of Ministers).
• Within three months: If the Governor withholds assent against the advice of the Council of Ministers, the Bill must be returned with reasons within this period.
• Within one month of re-passage: If the legislature re-passes the Bill without amendments, the Governor is constitutionally obligated to grant assent within one month.

This interpretive framework introduces administrative discipline into the otherwise open-ended provisions of Article 200. The Court was careful to clarify that its decision does not create a “deemed assent” mechanism, unlike other jurisdictions where inaction may automatically result in approval. Rather, the ruling empowers courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether any delay was justified. Thus, the judiciary retains oversight without overstepping its constitutional role.

This approach also harmonizes Article 200 with Articles 14 and 21, invoking the principle that arbitrariness is antithetical to the rule of law. The Governor’s powers are not above scrutiny and must be exercised in furtherance of democratic governance. Notably, the Court invoked the concept of “constitutional urgency” to underline that lawmaking is a continuous, time-sensitive process and that delays, if allowed to persist without scrutiny, can destabilize legislative sovereignty and render state governance ineffective.

Moreover, the judgment advanced the constitutional morality of cooperative federalism. The Governor’s role is not to be that of an adversarial watchdog sent by the Union but rather a facilitator of state governance. The interpretive intervention by the Court was thus not an incursion into legislative or executive domain but a necessary step to restore functional balance in Centre-State relations. In drawing timelines where the text was silent, the Court made Article 200 operationally effective without violating the principle of separation of powers.

In sum, the Court’s reading of Article 200 is a milestone in Indian constitutional law. It shifts the focus from formalistic literalism to a purposive, functional, and principle-based interpretation. By asserting that reasonableness must be read into every constitutional power, the judgment restores democratic accountability in gubernatorial conduct and closes a loophole long exploited to paralyze state-level lawmaking. It marks a decisive move toward ensuring that constitutional offices do not become tools for political obstruction but remain true to their intended roles within India’s federal democratic fabric.

Democratic Accountability and Federalism: Implications for Centre-State Relations

The Supreme Court’s intervention in this case must be understood as more than a dispute over legislative assent; it is a constitutional reckoning with the deeper pathologies of India’s federal architecture. The misuse of Article 200, especially in states governed by parties opposed to the Union government, has become emblematic of an increasing executive centralization that undermines democratic accountability and erodes the autonomy of states. The Governor’s power to withhold or delay assent, originally conceived as a constitutional safeguard, has been strategically repurposed as a veto tool, weaponized in politically adversarial contexts to frustrate legitimate legislative agendas of elected state governments.

This phenomenon reflects a systemic breakdown of the federal compact. The appointment of Governors by the Union, without meaningful consultation with the concerned state governments, combined with the absence of enforceable timelines for key constitutional functions, creates a perverse incentive structure. It enables a constitutionally unaccountable actor to effectively derail the mandate of a democratically elected Assembly, thereby violating the principle of responsible government. When the Governor, under the pretext of “discretion,” acts as an extension of the Centre’s political apparatus, the result is not merely administrative delay but a delegitimization of state-level democratic processes.

The Tamil Nadu case is not an outlier. In recent years, states like West Bengal, Kerala, Punjab, Maharashtra, and Telangana have all experienced similar executive logjams, where Governors refused to grant assent or delayed decisions on Bills related to state-specific priorities, whether it be university appointments, local language promotion, or social welfare. These actions are rarely based on legal infirmities in the Bills; instead, they signal a partisan obstructionism, often coinciding with moments of heightened political contestation between the Centre and non-BJP ruled states. This pattern of behavior has led to the shrinking of policy-making space for states, which, under the Constitution, are co-equal partners in governance.

The Supreme Court’s judgment seeks to reverse this erosion by tethering gubernatorial conduct to constitutional morality, cooperative federalism, and the imperative of democratic responsiveness. By asserting that inaction is not a constitutionally permissible course and by introducing timelines through judicial interpretation, the Court has partially restored equilibrium. The ruling recognizes that the federal principle is not a mechanical division of powers, but a living ethos that must be nurtured through institutional restraint and mutual respect between constitutional actors.

However, while the judgment is normatively sound and structurally progressive, it may not be sufficient to address the foundational asymmetry embedded in Article 200 itself. The lack of enforceable mechanisms to hold Governors accountable, either through legislative scrutiny or judicial review of discretionary acts, continues to pose a structural challenge. The Court’s guidelines, though binding, do not carry the coercive weight of statutory or constitutional timelines, and therefore, their future enforcement remains contingent on political will and judicial intervention.

A more durable solution may lie in constitutional or statutory reform. Several expert commissions, the Sarkaria Commission (1988), the Punchhi Commission (2010), and the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2002), have proposed that Article 200 should be amended to fix a definite time limit (e.g., three months) for gubernatorial action on Bills. Alternatively, a statutory framework under Article 246, or a uniform protocol through a Parliament-enacted Governor’s Conduct Act, could be introduced to codify the obligations of constitutional functionaries in their interface with elected state governments.

Such reforms would serve not only as a procedural fix but also as a normative reaffirmation of the federal idea, where state governments are not subordinate administrative units but constitutionally recognized centres of political will and public legitimacy. Ultimately, the Governor’s office must be reimagined not as a buffer between the Centre and the State, but as a ceremonial bridge that reinforces constitutionalism rather than obstructing it.

The Supreme Court’s judgment thus marks an important jurisprudential milestone, but it must be viewed as a beginning rather than a culmination. Without deeper structural changes, the misuse of Article 200 will remain a recurring threat to India’s federal equilibrium. To secure the future of democratic accountability and uphold the true spirit of responsible government, India must now engage in a serious conversation about the limits of gubernatorial discretion and the safeguards needed to protect the sanctity of state legislative processes.

Revisiting the Debate on the Office of the Governor: Need for Constitutional Reform?

This case has reignited a longstanding constitutional dilemma: what is the legitimate role of the Governor in a democratic federation, and does the current model serve or subvert that vision? While the Court’s intervention addressed the narrow misuse of Article 200, the deeper institutional problem lies in the structural design and operational culture of the gubernatorial office itself. This case, like many before it, is a symptom of a much larger and unresolved constitutional tension, the contradiction between the Governor’s dual identity as a formal head of a state and a political appointee of the Union executive.

The Constitution envisages the Governor as a constitutional figurehead, expected to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers under Article 163. Yet, the nature of the appointment, by the President acting on the advice of the Union Cabinet, without any role for the state government, has often transformed the office into an instrument of political oversight, rather than one of constitutional guardianship. This top-down selection model, combined with the absence of any fixed tenure or removal safeguards, gives rise to a class of appointees who are seen, and often act, as extensions of the Centre’s political agenda.

Judicial pronouncements have repeatedly attempted to clarify the constitutional limits of gubernatorial power. In Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court laid down that the Governor is bound by ministerial advice except in very narrow discretionary areas. In B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, the Court held that while Governors serve at the pleasure of the President, removals must be based on valid reasons and not arbitrary whims. Yet, these decisions have done little to deter partisan conduct, largely because the consequences for misuse are negligible, and because constitutional conventions in India have failed to take deep root in the executive culture.

This case is the latest in a long list of political standoffs involving Governors. In West Bengal, the former Governor was locked in prolonged confrontation with the elected Chief Minister, particularly over university appointments and law-and-order statements. In Kerala, the Governor refused to sign Bills passed by the legislature and questioned cabinet decisions in public forums. In Maharashtra, the Governor’s role in the midnight swearing-in ceremony of a government later found to lack majority support raised serious doubts about constitutional propriety. These episodes point to a clear pattern: whenever a non-aligned state government seeks to pursue an assertive legislative or policy agenda, the Governor’s office is too often deployed as a counterweight, delaying decisions, withholding assent, or openly contesting the government’s actions.

The institutional design of the Governor’s office has attracted criticism from several high-powered constitutional bodies. The Sarkaria Commission (1988), which studied Centre-State relations, concluded that while the office of the Governor is necessary, its legitimacy depends on neutrality and restraint. It recommended that Governors should be eminent persons with no active political affiliation and should be appointed in consultation with the state’s Chief Minister. The Punchhi Commission (2010) went further, recommending fixed tenure, detailed guidelines for the exercise of discretionary power, and a Code of Conduct to ensure that Governors do not act as agents of the Centre. Yet, these recommendations remain largely unimplemented.

The central question that arises post this case is whether the Governor’s legislative role, especially under Article 200, should continue to exist in its current form. If the Governor is not directly accountable to the state legislature or judiciary in matters of delay or discretion, and if there is no institutional mechanism for the state to seek redress swiftly, then the risk of constitutional subversion remains high. One line of reform would be to legislatively or constitutionally fix timelines for gubernatorial assent, as was implicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court. A more radical proposition would be to completely remove or severely limit the Governor’s role in legislative assent, converting it into a ceremonial formality akin to presidential assent at the Union level.

Some scholars have even proposed that Article 200 and Article 201 be amended to abolish the option of withholding or reserving Bills, restricting the Governor’s options to either assent or return the Bill with reasons, once. If the legislature re-passes the Bill, the Governor must be bound to give assent. Such a model would not only restore the primacy of the elected legislature but also reduce the potential for federal friction, particularly in a politically plural democracy.

More ambitiously, a constitutional rethink on the very necessity of the Governor’s office may be warranted. In the years since independence, the office has drifted far from its intended moorings. Instead of serving as a stabilizing constitutional figure, it has too often become a flashpoint of federal disruption. The case of Tamil Nadu underscores how a procedural power with no timeline or accountability mechanism can lead to a constitutional deadlock, not merely a technical delay.

India’s federal future hinges on institutional redesigns that prioritize democratic legitimacy, constitutional fidelity, and institutional trust. The Governor’s office, in its current incarnation, fails that test. If cooperative federalism is to be a lived reality rather than an aspirational slogan, then the time has come to confront the structural obsolescence of gubernatorial powers. Whether through amendment, codification, or abolishment, the debate must now move beyond case-by-case corrections and towards systemic transformation.

(This post has been authored by Tejas Hinder, an associate at Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas and an editor at TCLF)

CITE AS: Tejas Hinder, ‘’ (The Contemporary Law Forum, 26 April 2025) <https://tclf.in/2025/04/26/reinforcing-constitutional-boundaries-a-legal-analysis-of-the-supreme-courts-verdict-in-state-of-tamil-nadu-v-governor-of-tamil-nadu/>date of access.