Introduction
A company does not exist as a separate legal entity before its registration. Promoters often need to secure finances, premises, equipment or intellectual property before the company is registered, but the gap between the commercial need for finance and the lack of legal personality leads promoters to enter into pre-incorporation contracts. These are agreements entered into by a promoter, in the name of or for the benefit of the company that has not yet come into existence. Sections 15(h) and 19(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (SRA) allow for specific performance of such a contract by or against the company, provided the contract was warranted by the terms of incorporation and the company communicates its acceptance to the other party. These provisions govern specific performance alone, and leave third parties in uncertainty, as the company is not bound to accept or reject the contract within a specific time period. There is also no duty on the company to compensate the third party.
Existing scholarship analyses pre-incorporation contracts from the perspective of the promoter and the company. It has largely ignored the third party who provides finances to the promoter on the strength of a promise that the company will step into the contract. The third party has no say in the company’s decision to adopt the contract, and no timeline is prescribed within which the company must decide. This paper addresses the question where the company neither accepts nor rejects the contract, or rejects it but retains its benefit, how should the resulting risk be allocated between the company and the third party? It argues that where the company benefits from the contract, it should share the risk, as it is better placed to monitor and price it.
Pre-Incorporation Contracts: The Adoption Framework and Its Unresolved Gaps
Under traditional common law, a company cannot be bound by a pre-incorporation contract, as it was not a legal person at the time of agreement. The only way for a company to adopt the terms of the contract was through novation.[1] Later, the English position shifted due to European Union directives, resulting in Section 36C of the Companies Act, 1985 (now contained in Section 51 of the Companies Act, 2006). The statute presumes the promoter’s personal liability unless the agreement provides otherwise.[2] It still does not allow the company to unilaterally ratify these contracts, and it can only be done through novation.[3]
The Indian legislature departed from this. Under the SRA, a company may adopt a pre-incorporation contract if the contract was made by a promoter for the company and the company accepts the contract and communicates this acceptance to the other party. A promoter, defined in Section 2(69) of the Companies Act, 2013, stands in a fiduciary relation to company being incorporated. In Jai Narain v Pushpa Devi, the Supreme Court observed that a promoter who buys immovable property on behalf of a company under incorporation cannot deny it the benefit of that purchase once it is incorporated.
Placed beside comparable jurisdictions, the Indian position is unusual in a specific way. Three legislative models can be distinguished. The first makes the promoter personally liable by default and binds the company only on ratification within an agreed or reasonable time. This is the English position under Section 51, the Australian position under Sections 131 to 133 of the Corporations Act 2001, the Canadian position under Section 14 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, and the New Zealand position under Sections 182 to 185 of the Companies Act 1993. The second model adds a deeming rule that operates on the company’s silence, as South Africa does by treating a contract as ratified where the board neither ratifies nor rejects it within three months of incorporation. The third is the Indian model, under which the company’s liability depends on an election it may make at any time or not at all, and inaction carries no consequence.
Several of these systems also equip the court with a corrective power. Section 14(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act allows any party to the contract to apply for an order determining the nature and extent of the obligations of the corporation and of the person who contracted on its behalf, whether or not the contract was adopted. The Indian position differs in two respects. First, the SRA does not make the promoter personally liable by default, as Section 51 of the Companies Act 2006 does in England. Whether the promoter is liable is left to general principles of agency and common law. Under Section 230 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, an agent is not personally bound by a contract made for a principal unless there is a contract to that effect, but such a contract is presumed where the principal, though disclosed, cannot be sued. In this context, promoter liability may arise depending on the framing of the contract. Second, the statute does not attach any consequence to company’s silence. Among the systems discussed here, India is therefore the only one that supplies neither a statutory default liability on the promoter nor a consequence for the company’s silence.
Two things follow. First, the SRA scheme is closer to a statutory novation that depends entirely on the company’s own decision to accept. Second, nothing obliges the company to decide one way or the other within a specific time. Neither the SRA nor the Companies Act, 2013 provides an express mechanism for compensating the third party if the company benefits from performance without adopting the contract. Whether general law, such as Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, fills that gap is considered below. Unlike the Australian and South African statutes, the Companies Act, 2013 does not address pre-incorporation contracts.
Reorienting the Inquiry: The Third Party’s Predicament
The third party’s ability to enforce anything against the company depends on an act that lies within the company’s discretion. The decision of the company is taken by people who were not necessarily parties to the original negotiation, and who have every commercial incentive to remain silent or reject the contract when it has not turned out to be favourable. The party with the least information and control bears disproportionate risk associated with these contracts.
Three problems arise from this framework. First, the company may never act, leaving the third party’s claim in limbo. Second, it may reject the contract after the third party has already performed. This can have two consequences: either the third party is remediless, or the promoter is personally liable as an agent who contracted for a principal that did not exist. A claim against the promoter is, however, only as good as the promoter’s ability to pay. Where the promoter lacks the means to pay, that claim may be of little practical value to the third party. This is a practical concern rather than a rule of law, and how far it arises will vary with the promoter’s resources. Third, the company may reject the contract formally while continuing to retain the services.
Could a court simply infer acceptance from such conduct and close the third gap? Only to a limited extent. Sections 15(h) and 19(e) require acceptance communicated to the other party. A purely internal conduct, such as retaining the benefit of the third party’s performance, would not ordinarily meet that requirement. Conduct that objectively communicates acceptance to the other party may, however, suffice. In Jai Narain, the Supreme Court treated the company’s suit against the vendor, seeking a declaration that it owned the property, as amounting to acceptance of the contract and communication of that acceptance to the other party. That result depended on the company acting in a way directed at the other party. Where the company simply stays silent while retaining the benefit, the gap remains.
The concern is not that the company can choose. The problem is that the consequences of that choice fall unevenly. The third party bears the risk of delay, rejection, and uncertainty. Therefore, the reform should preserve the company’s choice, without allowing it to shift the cost of non-adoption to the third party.
Closing the Gap: Deemed Acceptance and Restitution as Twin Correctives
This paper proposes two reforms, both primarily directed at the Companies Act, 2013, since the problem concerns corporate obligation rather than the availability of a discretionary remedy.
The first addresses pure inaction by the company. If a company neither accepts nor rejects a pre-incorporation contract within a set period, the contract is deemed accepted. Sections 21(4) and (5) of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 deem ratification where the board neither ratifies nor rejects within three months of incorporation. The criticism that there is no mechanism to ensure the board learns of the contract at all can be answered by the requirement of third-party notice. Such notice compels an election and places the facts before the company’s own decision-makers. The company is bound only after being informed about the existence of the contract and given a chance to reject it. A deeming rule placed only in the Companies Act would not be enough, because Sections 15(h) and 19(e) of the SRA require that the company’s acceptance be communicated to the other party. Therefore, the reform needs one of two forms. The Companies Act provision could state that a contract deemed accepted under it is to be treated, for the purposes of Sections 15(h) and 19(e) of the SRA, as accepted and communicated to the other party. Alternatively, those sections could be amended correspondingly. In either case, the deeming rule should apply only where the third party has given the company notice of the contract and the set period has run without the company accepting or rejecting it.
The second reform addresses situations where the company rejects the contract yet retains its benefit, and the promoter cannot pay the third party. The South African scheme under Section 21(7) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 recognises accounting for benefits retained after rejection. Section 70 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 obliges a person who benefits from a non-gratuitous act to compensate the person who performed it. Whether it assists the third party depends on when the third party performed, and the two situations should be distinguished.
The first situation is performance before incorporation. Here Section 70 is uncertain because it requires the act to have been done “for another person,” and the company did not exist when the third party performed. The second situation is performance after incorporation but before the company accepts or rejects the contract. In this situation, the uncertainty lies because the third party must still show that it performed for the company rather than simply for the promoter under the original contract, and it must litigate that question without statutory guidance. Under the proposals in this paper, silence after incorporation is dealt with by the first reform, and the second reform applies where the company rejects the contract and retains the benefit, whether that benefit was received before or after incorporation. This uncertainty should be resolved by a direct restitutionary claim against the company, on the principles of unjust enrichment, to the extent the company has been unjustly enriched at the third party’s expense by retaining goods and services. In this regard, an analogy can be drawn from the Australian Corporations Act 2001. Under Section 131(3) of the Corporations Act 2001, where proceedings are brought to recover damages from the person who contracted for a company because the company has been registered but has not ratified the contract, the court may order the company to pay all or part of those damages, to transfer property the company received because of the contract to a party to the contract, or to pay an amount to a party to the contract. That power is discretionary and arises within proceedings against the promoter. The reform proposed here differs in giving the third party a direct claim against the company.
To prevent this restitutionary claim from becoming a backdoor route to full contractual recovery, the third party’s award should be capped at the value of the benefit the company retained. This framework preserves the line between adoption, which carries full contractual liability, and non-adoption coupled with retained benefit, which carries only restitutionary liability. In cases where the company rejects the contract without retaining any benefit, the third party’s claim is primarily against the promoter.
An objection could be raised that third parties can protect themselves through a promoter’s guarantee or a condition precedent requiring adoption. This may be true for sophisticated parties, but small suppliers with limited bargaining power and limited means of assessing a company’s post-incorporation intentions are still exposed to risk.
Another objection is that the problem is disappearing. Incorporation in India is now largely an online process, and a promoter who can register a company within days has little reason to contract before doing so. The premise is right but the conclusion does not follow. Speed of registration shortens the period before incorporation; it does nothing to the period after it, which is where the risk identified here lies. A supplier who performs in the first month and waits for an election that never comes is no better off because registration was quick. In any event, the transactions that most often precede incorporation are those that cannot wait. The lease that will otherwise be let to someone else, the equipment order with a long lead time, the assignment of intellectual property a founder must secure before investors will commit.
Conclusion
Sections 15(h) and 19(e) of the SRA, read together with jurisprudence that has evolved around pre-incorporation contracts, address the promoter’s and the company’s problems by making the company’s liability turn on its own act of acceptance. In doing so, the framework transfers the risk of the company’s inaction or rejection to a third party who never had any say in whether the company would come into existence, adopt the contract, or retain its benefits. A deemed acceptance rule for the company’s inaction, and an unjust enrichment claim where the company rejects the contract but keeps what it received, would correct this imbalance without disturbing the legitimate discretion that Sections 15(h) and 19(e) give to companies over bargains they never authorised in the first place.
(This post has been authored by Himanshu Yadav, a third-year B.A.LL.B. (Hons.) student at National Law School of India University, Bengaluru)
CITE AS: Himanshu Yadav, ‘The Risk Allocation and Third-Party Predicament in Pre-Incorporation Contracts’ (The Contemporary Law Forum, 18 November 2026) <https://tclf.in/2026/11/18/the-risk-allocation-and-third-party-predicament-in-pre-incorporation-contracts/> date of access.