BACKGROUND
About one in every three urban shoppers in India uses quick commerce for primary grocery shopping. While adoption of quick commerce and other e-commerce platforms has evolved rapidly, the regulatory oversight may be lagging behind. The users may have observed certain features being introduced lately such as apps showing number of drivers that have rejected your ride at the supposedly fair price. On the face of it, it may seem purely informational however, upon understanding the psychology it creates enhanced urgency in the mind of users. Earlier something which felt as simple as it will probably take a few minutes to get a ride turns into already rejected by most of the drivers, will probably need to increase the price.
Another such instance may be underlined regarding the difficulty of finding the option to cancel a ride. The Guidelines for Prevention and Regulation of Dark Patterns, 2023 under Annexure I (vi) on interface interference mandate threshold of cancellation or opting out being as easy for the user as opting in. However, on various platforms it is provided as an option under trip details which may be absurd in logic but equally deceptive in nature. This problem is heightened as drivers refuse or cite inability to cancel rides on their side while the user struggles to find the option to cancel.
There have been various developments with new forms of dark patterns emerging and not necessarily covered by the current regulatory frameworks in India. Suppose, an instance wherein an iPhone user and an android user try to book a cab, from the same place and for the same ride however, with many platforms that have device-based pricing the iPhone user will be charged more as compared to the android user. This issue of differential pricing remains unregulated in India. It is not only concerning from the perspective of consumer protection but also from the lens of data protection as often while this data is collected there is no clear disclosure as to its use in supporting differential pricing.
These instances bring to question wider challenges to be tackled by regulators, ensuring compliant platforms beyond privacy policies and aligning the privacy policies with evolving platform structures including the UI/ UX designs. The author seeks to highlight the gaps in the framework and provide recommendations through a comparative analysis with the European Union.
ALGORITHMIC DARK PATTERNS
As algorithms become increasingly tailored to the individual users, it opens up a plethora of opportunities of weaponizing such user data and user economic behaviour into dark patterns. For instance, if a user shows patterns of being an anxious buyer, the platforms may build a stronger sense of urgency for those buyers by implying a scarcity. On the flipside it may be tough to regulate these dark patterns, given they emerge from a black box making it difficult to pin point an exact pattern or clear intent.
In a case of notice sent by the Central Consumer Protection Authority to Ola and Uber for device-based pricing, there was no further action taken and no record of a further investigation. While taking into account the difficulties with ascertaining intent yet, a slap on the wrist approach significantly erodes at regulatory authority and consumer trust. It seemingly demonstrates that apart from reputational harm, by and large no substantial harm is to be suffered for indulging in dark patterns.
A higher degree of such algorithmic personalization may lead to a higher probability of getting addicted to such platforms specially, in case of social media platforms. The European Union has made a clear distinction between an addictive and ethical design of online services underlining the need for enhanced transparency obligations to be fulfilled by all online service providers. However, India lacks any form of regulatory oversight over such addictive design of online platforms.
ENFORCEMENT COMPARITIVE
The European Union has clearly laid out anti-circumvention principle under Article 13 of the Digital Markets Act, which codifies that an investigation may be opened even in cases where any digital platform is attempting to circumvent legislative requirements. It significantly enhances the powers of enforcement authorities beyond acting like a paper tiger. These measures in tandem with the Market Surveillance Regulations of the European Union frame a distinct picture of stringent enforcement. The Market Surveillance Regulations highlight a marked shift in the paradigm in responsibility of the regulator, from mandating cognisance upon receiving any complaints from users to requiring a proactive approach to ensure markets protect consumer interests.
The Market Surveillance Regulations provide a structured approach to enforcement through a nodal agency dedicated for market surveillance, with the objective as laid down under Article 1 to ensure that only compliant products that fulfil all requirements are available in the market. Under Article 22, it provides for cross-governance collaboration with ability to request mutual assistance from another authority. In the Indian framework, it may gain relevance by virtue of intersections particularly between consumer protection, information technology and data privacy.
Beyond mutual assistance to tackle investigations, Article 9 provides for joint activities to promote compliance as goals align between different regulators. The joint activities provide for better execution of such promotion with pooled resources and synchronised effort to avoid overlaps. In the Indian context, it may be useful particularly in the fintech sector with multiple authorities involved, Reserve Bank of India, Ministry of Information Technology and now with a phased-out implementation Data Protection Board of India.
The Article 3 (18) (19) & (20) provide for clear categorisation of risks, through distinction of any product presenting a serious risk wherein risk is calculated basis two variables probability of harm and impact of harm. Such an objective understanding of risk and clear categorisation removes ambiguity from the systems and enhances certainty for businesses.
RECOMENDATIONS
- Recognition and cognisance of addictive design and algorithmic price differentiation.
- Establishment of a nodal agency with requisite powers to investigate, impose heavier penalties and collaborate with other government authorities.
- Risk profiling and adequate classification basis risks associated.
- Mandating a proactive approach to market regulation.
CONCLUSIONS
Thus, while Indian digital platforms become increasingly adopted by users it is pertinent that such growth does not undermine consumer protection. It gains heightened relevance as there is an inherent imbalance of bargaining power between technological giants and consumers needing regulators to step in. The framework for enforcement must be revisited and strive to align with international best practices as may be tailored to suit Indian markets.
(This post has been authored by Honey Acharya, a 4th year student at Symbiosis Law School, Pune.)
CITE AS: Honey Acharaya, ‘Shedding Some Light: Emerging Dark Patterns’ (The Contemporary Law Forum, 1 July 2026) <https://tclf.in/2026/07/01/shedding-some-light-emerging-dark-patterns/> date of access.