Introduction
The Indian judiciary has a disturbing history of granting bail to rape accused on the condition that they marry their victims. This practice is not only legally flawed but also profoundly unjust, as it forces survivors into coerced relationships with their perpetrators rather than ensuring their right to justice. Such rulings violate multiple statutory provisions, including the Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’), Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (‘POCSOA’), and Prohibition of Child Marriage Act (‘PCMA’), while also contradicting Supreme Court (‘SC’) precedents that have categorically rejected marriage as a remedy for rape. Despite these legal safeguards, high courts continue to prioritize societal notions of family honour and reconciliation over the survivor’s right to dignity and autonomy.
This paper examines this judicial trend by analysing the recent Allahabad HC ruling in Naresh Meena v. State of Uttar Pradesh (‘Naresh Meena’), where bail was granted to a rape accused on the condition that he marry the survivor within three months. The judgment was silent on whether the survivor had been consulted, reflecting the broader problem of courts disregarding the agency and well-being of rape survivors. This case is not an exception but part of a long list of similar rulings, demonstrating a systemic failure of the judiciary to uphold the rule of law in sexual violence cases.
The paper proceeds in seven sections. Section II begins with a detailed analysis of the order in Naresh Meena, highlighting its legal and ethical flaws, as well as the implications of imposing marriage as a condition for bail. Section III expands on this problematic pattern by examining previous high court cases where similar rulings have been issued. Section IV reviews SC rulings that have explicitly condemned the use of marriage as a legal remedy for rape. Section V examines the statutory and constitutional violations inherent in these rulings, demonstrating how they contradict various statutes and fundamental right protections.
Section VI argues for judicial accountability and reform, calling for mandatory gender-sensitivity training for judges, stricter enforcement of Supreme Court rulings, and stronger oversight to prevent such legally flawed judgments. Section VII concludes.
Analysing the Judicial Reasoning
In Naresh Meena v. State of Uttar Pradesh, Krishan Pahal J granted bail to the accused Naresh Meena on the condition that he marry the survivor within three months. This controversial directive was issued without explaining why such a condition was imposed or whether the victim’s consent was sought. The silence of the order on these crucial aspects raises serious questions about the legitimacy of the decision.
The case presents a troubling set of facts. The accused allegedly lured the victim under false promises, took ₹9 lakh from her, sexually assaulted her, and later circulated an obscene video of her on social media. The gravity of these accusations, particularly the exploitation of technological means to perpetuate further harm against the survivor, emphasises the serious nature of the alleged offence. Despite this, the court found that there were no exceptional circumstances warranting the denial of bail. It justified its decision by citing the general principle that “bail is a rule, jail is an exception” and emphasised the presumption of innocence unless proven guilty. However, the inclusion of marriage as a bail condition contradicts the very foundation of criminal jurisprudence, as it suggests that legal proceedings can be circumvented if the accused agrees to wed the victim.
One of the most concerning aspects of this judgment is the complete lack of consideration for the victim’s autonomy. Nowhere does the order indicate whether the court sought the victim’s opinion or if she was even willing to marry her accused rapist. When courts impose marriage as a condition for bail, it creates an environment where the victim is pressured into compliance, fearing that refusing might lead to further legal or social repercussions. This is particularly concerning in a society where survivors often face immense familial and societal pressure to avoid legal battles and “settle” such cases outside the courtroom. The court’s approach legitimizes such coercion and reinforces patriarchal notions that place the burden of compromise on the survivor rather than ensuring that the perpetrator is held accountable.
Furthermore, the judgment does not take into account the broader legal and constitutional implications of such a directive. Indian law does not recognize marriage as a ‘remedy’ for rape. Section 376 of the IPC treats rape as a non-compoundable offense, meaning that it cannot be settled between the parties outside the judicial process. By offering marriage as an alternative to legal consequences, the court has essentially undermined the statutory framework designed to protect survivors and punish offenders.
The rationale provided by the court for granting bail also raises concerns. The judge emphasised that the state had not presented any exceptional circumstances warranting the denial of bail, but this reasoning overlooks the fact that the accused had allegedly used technology to blackmail and humiliate the victim. Given that digital offenses often have a lasting impact on survivors, with threats of continued harassment and social ostracization, the court’s failure to consider this aspect reflects a narrow and outdated understanding of sexual crimes in the digital age.
A Disturbing Pattern
Naresh Meena is not an isolated misjudgement but part of a deeply troubling judicial pattern in which Indian courts have granted bail to rape accused on the condition that they marry their victims. Over the past decade, multiple high courts have granted bail in rape cases based on the accused’s willingness to marry the survivor. These rulings normalize the idea that a rapist can escape punishment if he agrees to “take responsibility” for the survivor, as if marriage were a suitable punishment for sexual violence rather than a fundamental violation of human rights.
This reflects an entrenched patriarchal mindset where sexual violence is seen not as a crime demanding strict legal consequences, but as a disruption to the social order that can be “rectified” through marriage. These judgments trivialise rape, turning it into a matter of familial negotiation rather than legal accountability.
In Atul Gautam v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Allahabad HC granted bail to a man accused of raping a fifteen-year-old girl after he promised to marry her and take care of their newborn child. Despite the fact that child marriage is illegal under the PCMA, and that sexual activity with a minor is automatically considered rape under POCSOA, Rajesh Singh Chauhan J granted bail on the condition that the accused marry the victim. The court framed the marriage as a solution to the survivor’s circumstances, ignoring the inherent coercion involved in such an arrangement.
A similar ruling followed in Abhishek v. State of Uttar Pradesh, where Krishan Pahal J and the Allahabad HC once again granted bail to a man accused of raping and impregnating a seventeen-year-old girl. Despite the state’s argument that the survivor was still legally a minor and incapable of giving consent, the court justified granting bail based on the accused’s willingness to marry her. This ruling ignored the fundamental principle that POCSO treats all sexual activity with minors as rape, irrespective of alleged consent, and that marriage with a minor is legally invalid. Similarly, in Monu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Allahabad HC’s Lucknow Bench granted bail to a rape accused on the condition that he marry his seventeen-year-old victim within fifteen days of release. The court reasoned that because both the survivor and her father had “no objection” to the accused’s release, the marriage could proceed.
The Karnataka HC in a 2024 ruling continued this trend by granting interim bail to a man accused under POCSO so that he could marry his victim, who had since turned eighteen and given birth to their child. Concerningly, the court framed the case as one of “complicated personal circumstances” rather than a serious criminal offense, arguing that the child “should not suffer social ignominy” and that the survivor “needed support” in raising the child.
The Allahabad HC repeated this approach in another 2024 ruling, where Chauhan J granted bail to a rape accused despite the survivor being only seventeen years old at the time of the incident. The court cited the couple’s willingness to marry as a justification for bail, again failing to acknowledge the fact that such rulings encourage a culture of impunity for rapists. The state had explicitly argued that the survivor was a minor based on medical tests, yet the court ignored this evidence and instead prioritised marriage over legal accountability.
The Bombay High Courtalso contributed to this troubling judicial pattern in Satish Eknath Kakade v. State of Maharashtra, where Mehare J granted bail to a man accused of impregnating a fourteen-year-old minor on the condition that he marry her once she reached adulthood. The court justified its decision by citing the family’s economic situation and societal pressures. It treated poverty as a justification for child marriage, stating that the family had arranged the marriage with “good intent” to provide security for the minor girl. Mehare J granted bail despite the prosecution’s argument that such rulings would undermine the purpose of the POCSO Act and encourage the normalisation of child marriage.
These cases are not an exhaustive list; they are merely the most recent examples of this disturbing judicial tendency. These cases demonstrate a consistent failure of the judiciary to uphold the principles of justice in rape cases. Courts that impose marriage as a condition for bail do not merely fail to enforce the law; they actively subvert legal protections meant to safeguard survivors from further victimization. Instead of ensuring strict legal action against rapists, these rulings facilitate coercion, re-traumatization, and continued abuse.
Beyond the immediate impact on individual survivors, these rulings set a dangerous precedent for future rape cases. When courts normalize marriage as a resolution for rape, they encourage defence lawyers to use marriage as a legal strategy to secure bail or reduced sentencing. This practice sends a clear message that rape is not a serious crime but a negotiable offense, emboldening perpetrators and discouraging survivors from coming forward. Many rape survivors already face immense pressure from their families and communities to withdraw their cases, and such judicial rulings only reinforce that seeking justice will lead to further coercion rather than relief.
A Clear Violation of Precedents
The repeated defiance of SC directives with high courts continuing to grant bail in rape cases under conditions that violate both the letter and spirit of these rulings. The fact that such judgments are still being issued in 2025 demonstrates a systemic failure within the judiciary to internalize the constitutional and legal principles meant to protect survivors of sexual violence. Lower courts are either wilfully ignoring SC directives or lack the gender sensitivity required to adjudicate such cases appropriately.
In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal, the Court strongly condemned the idea that any sort of compromise could be a solution to rape. It stated that rape is a crime against the dignity of a woman and cannot be legitimised through marriage. It further noted that allowing such settlements would encourage rapists to manipulate survivors into marriage as a means of avoiding punishment, thereby weakening the deterrent effect of rape laws.
A more explicit rejection of such bail conditions came in Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh, where the SC addressed the growing tendency of lower courts to impose marriage as a condition in sexual violence cases. The case arose after a HC judge granted bail to a rape accused and directed him to “convince” the survivor to marry him. The SC ruled that such conditions were not only unconstitutional and illegal but also deeply misogynistic and insensitive to the trauma of survivors. It held that courts must never impose conditions that compromise the dignity and autonomy of a survivor, and explicitly directed judges to refrain from making gender-insensitive remarks or rulings that reinforce harmful social stereotypes about women.
In Shimbhu v. State of Haryana, the SC ruled that the severity of rape as a crime cannot be diluted through social compromises. The case involved a convicted rapist who sought a reduced sentence by arguing that he had “settled the matter” with the survivor’s family. The Court rejected this argument outright, stating that allowing rapists to walk free based on such arrangements would destroy public confidence in the legal system and send a message that sexual violence is negotiable. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan & Ors. saw the Court clarify that serious cases like rape cannot be quashed through settlements under Section 482 of the CrPC, as this would be a violation of public policy.
The SC’s rulings leave no ambiguity on this issue: rape is a criminal offense that must be punished, and marriage cannot be used as a justification for bail, a reduced sentence, or the quashing of charges.
[continued in next part]
(This post has been authored by Saksham Agarwal, a second-year undergraduate law student at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore)
CITE AS: Saksham Agarwal, ‘A Critique of Naresh Meena v State of UP and the Practice of Marriage-Conditional Bail in India: Part I’ (The Contemporary Law Forum, 10 April 2025) <https://tclf.in/2025/04/10/a-critique-of-naresh-meena-v-state-of-up-and-the-practice-of-marriage-conditional-bail-in-india-part-I/>date of access.