Introduction
The Supreme Court (“SC”), in Anjum Kadari v. Union of India (“Anjum Kadari”), upheld the constitutionality of the Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act 2004 (“Act”), overturning the decision by the Allahabad High Court (“HC”) in Anshuman Singh Rathore v. Union of India (“Anshuman Rathore”) which had found the Act violative of Article 28(1) and secularism.[1] The Act is a regulatory framework for the Madarsa education in Uttar Pradesh. It outlines the powers, functions, and organisation of the education board.[2] The board is entrusted with the responsibility of setting the standards of education provided in the Madarsas and is concerned with issues of curriculum, instruction, conduct of examinations and qualifications of teaching.[3] The Allahabad HC found the Act unconstitutional for promoting religious instruction in state-funded institutions, but the Supreme Court overturned this, permitting such instruction as long as its primary aim is “education”.[4] The SC blurred the lines between ‘religious education’ and religious instruction’. The SC’s inability to draw a clear distinction between the two and its consequent conflation of the terms runs counter to established precedents, which bear grave implications for future interpretation. Through a review of Anshuman Rathore, Anjum Kadari, and other related precedents, the paper shall prove that while the SC aimed at protecting the cultural and religious rights of religious minorities, it has inadequately addressed the concerns raised in Anshuman Rathore, which is due to obscuring the distinction between the two terminologies.
The paper is divided into six sections. Subsection I studies the distinction drawn by the Allahabad High Court between religious instruction and religious education in Anshuman Rathore. Subsection II examines precedents to determine how the distinction between religious instruction and religious education has been drawn. Subsection III critically analyses Anjum Kadari in lieu of the precedents and Anshuman Rathore. Subsection IV looks into the implications of the judgment in Anjum Kadari. Part V finally concludes the paper.
Critical questions raised in Anshuman Rathore
The petitioners in Anshuman Rathore had challenged the constitutional validity of the Act on the grounds that it violated secularism, Article 28(1), Article 14, Article 21 and 21-A.[5] The petitioners contended that the state-funded Madarsas impart religious instruction, which violates Article 28(1).[6] It was argued that Madarsas failed to provide modern, secular education.[7] The court approached the conundrum by answering how secularism could be balanced along with the rights of religious minorities guaranteed under Articles 25-30. The court cited precedents to claim that the state’s secular character shall not be disturbed as long as state interference in religious activity is meant to “respect all religions equally”.[8] Thereby, the court stated that ‘religious education’, that is, acquaintance with the basics of all religions, the values and philosophy inherent in each of the religions, along with comparative studies between the religions, in state-funded institutions, would not be violative of the basic feature of secularism.[9] The court proposed that knowledge of various religious philosophies is “material” for bringing communal harmony. [10] The court declared that Article only prohibits ‘religious instruction’ and not ‘religious education’.[11] .”[12] While the court did accept that imparting religious education in state-funded institutions would not be violative of the principles of secularism, it did maintain that the state cannot provide for the “education of a particular religion, its instructions, prescriptions and philosophies or create separate education systems for separate religions.”[13] The court, at this juncture, had determined what secularism is, looked into what ‘religious education’ is, and acquiesced with the precedents’ position on it. So, it would be Madarsas imparting ‘religious education’ and not ‘religious instruction’ that would align them to the state’s secular character and immune to the violation of Article 28(1).
Therefore, the court proceeded to move on to the primary challenge of examining whether Madarsas were imparting ‘religious education’ or ‘religious instruction’ – which would make all the difference. The court examined the curriculum of Madarsas. It was found that the Quran and Islam were compulsory in every class.[14] A student could not get promoted to the next class unless he clears his exams in compulsory subjects in Islam. In grade 10, Theology (Sunni) and Theology (Shia), Arabic, Persian, Urdu, General English and General Hindi are compulsory subjects, and they are to study only one of the subjects from amongst Maths, Logic & Philosophy, Social Science, Science and Tib (Medical Science).[15] It remains the same till grade 12. The court found that it was compulsory for a student of Madarsa to study all the prescriptions, instructions, and philosophies to get promoted to the next class.[16] Additionally, modern subjects are either absent or optional.[17] The purpose of the Madarsas, the court determined, was only for “promoting and providing education of Islam, its prescriptions, instructions and philosophies and to spread the same By maintaining this strict distinction between ‘religious instruction; and ‘religious education’, the court settled that the object of the Act violates the principle of secularism and Article 28(1).
The Allahabad HC in Anshuman Rathore clearly defined the distinction between religious instruction and religious education while at the same time maintaining a balance between, protecting the principles of secularism, along with the religious and cultural rights of minorities guaranteed under Articles 25-30. It carefully scrutinised the curriculum and syllabus of the Madarsas recognised under the Act to determine whether it was ‘religious instruction’ or ‘religious education’.
The next part of the paper looks at how precedents have differentiated between ‘religious instruction’ and ‘religious education’.
The distinction between ‘religious instruction’ and ‘religious education’
Courts have been long challenged to balance secularism with religious rights. The question of State interference in institutions educating a particular religion is nothing new. The question first arose in the case of DAV College v. State of Punjab (”DAV College”). In this case, the Guru Nanak University Amritsar Act was challenged on the grounds that it required all the colleges affiliated with the University to introduce Sikh religious courses, making the study of the Sikh religion mandatory.[18] The petitioners argued that the law imposed religious instruction, which violates Article 28(1) and the principles of secularism.[19] The court was obliged to define what ‘religious instruction’ meant and delineate the kind of education which would not fall under its ambit. The court defined religious instruction as “inculcating the tenets, the rituals, the observances, ceremonies and modes of worship of a particular sect or denomination”.[20] The court added that the culture and the religious impact of a great saint in the context of Indian and world civilizations in the academic and philosophical context would not constitute religious indoctrination.[21] While the court did not explicitly use the word ‘religious education’, the court did lay down what it meant, and is cited by subsequent judgements. A reasonable distinction between ‘religious instruction’ and ‘religious education’ is seen to be made by the court traversing the thin line between secularism and the rights of religious minorities.
The case of The Ahmedabad St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat (“St. Xaviers”), followed this precedent. It interpreted Article 28(3), which prohibits the compulsion of religious instruction on students in state-funded educational institutions.[22] The court stated that Article 28(3) implies that an educational institution managed by a religious minority has the liberty to provide for religious education along with general secular education.[23] The court suggested that “the State’s interest in education, so far as religious minorities are concerned, would be served sufficiently, by reliance on secular education accompanied by optional religious training…”[24] It declared that imparting religious instruction in addition to secular education in state-funded educational institutions, would be in line with Article 28(3).[25] The court emphasised that the constitutional right of imparting education in institutions administered by religious minorities cannot be questioned as long as they meet the standard established for secular education.[26] The court defined ‘secular education; as the state’s interest in “ensuring that the children within its boundaries acquire a minimum level of competency in skills, as well as a minimum amount of information and knowledge in certain subjects”.[27] Therefore, the court imposes an obligation upon the educational institutions administrated by religious minorities to impart such education, which will produce competent individuals fit to participate in a democratic society and earn a living.[28] Again, the SC is found to reconcile secularism with the educational autonomy of religious minorities.
The case of Aruna Roy v. Union of India (“Aruna Roy”) is a landmark judgement where the SC precisely and explicitly defined the terms ‘religious instruction’ and ‘religious education’ and differentiated between them in the context of Article 28(1). The petitioners had challenged the National Curriculum Framework for School Education, 2000, arguing that it proposed teaching moral and ethical values derived from religious texts.[29] The contention of the petitioner was that it amounted to ‘religious instruction’ and was violative of secularism and Article 28(1).[30] M.B. Shah upheld that the knowledge of various philosophies is material for bringing communal harmony.[31] Article 28(1) did not prohibit the study of philosophy and culture, particularly for having a value-based social life in a society.[32]
It was Justice Dharamadhikari, in his concurring judgment, who clarified the nature of religious education that is permitted to be imparted in educational institutions funded by the state under Article 28(1).[33] He cited DAV College and expressed concern about the possibility of imparting ‘religious instruction’ in the name of ‘religious education’ if the two terms were not appropriately distinguished.[34] He considered the possibility of “indoctrination or brainwashing of the children and thus curbing their inquisitiveness and free thinking in the name of religion.”[35] He defined religious education as not just restricted to beliefs, rituals, hopes and fear, but rather to help the child to be intelligently aware.[36] According to Article 28(1), he said, only religious education can be permitted, which is to be based on “religious pluralism”.[37] In ‘religious pluralism’ or ‘explicit pluralism’, it is recognised that religions across the world embody different perceptions, conceptions and responses to reach the truth, and each of them, in their own way, facilitates the transformation of human existence from self-centredness to reality-centredness.[38] This interpretation of ‘religious education’ denies ‘exclusivism’, that is, the view that only one particular religion or tradition alone teaches the truth or constitutes the way to salvation or liberation.[39] The judgement cited the constituent assembly debates where B.R. Ambedkar attempted to interpret the phrase ‘religious instruction’ in Article 28(1).[40] The court upheld his view that religious instruction was to “be distinguished from research or study”.[41] B.R. Ambedkar defined religious instruction as believing in a dogma, which is quite different from a study.[42] In this way, Justice Dharmadhikari, while vouching for the study of religions, as he deemed it important for the “unity and integrity of India”, also defined what all it constituted, what it meant, and how it should be executed.[43] Aruna Roy remains a remarkable precedent which mirrors the same issue present in Anjum Kadari.
While Aruna Roy was a comprehensive judgement which did not leave any stone unturned while dealing with the conundrum of ‘religious instruction’ v. ‘religious education’, the next part questions whether Anjum Kadari, conducted the same scrutiny in light of the precedents laid down and Anshuman Rathore.
[continued in next part]
(This post has been authored by Vaishnavi E P, third-year student at WBNUJS, Kolkata)
CITE AS: Vaishnavi E P ‘RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION V. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN ANJUM KADARI – Part I’ (The Contemporary Law Forum, 5 November 2025) <https://tclf.in/2025/11/05/religious-instruction-v-religious-education-unanswered-questions-in-anjum-kadari-part-i/>date of access.