The mistake committed in Anjum Kadari
The SC discussed secularism in the constitutional context, and Article 28(1).[1] It cited Aruna Roy, and DAV College to lay down a distinction between ‘religious instruction’ and ‘religious education’.[2] It stated that Article 28(1) does not prohibit imparting ‘religious education’.[3] Additionally, it relied on St. Xavier’s to declare that Article 28 does not prohibit the State from granting recognition to educational institutions imparting religious instruction in addition to secular education.[4] The SC had respected the distinction between the terminologies as declared by the precedents. However, the SC seems to selectively apply the precedents in the matter of Madarsas in Anjum Kadari while ignoring the important concerns raised in Anshuman Rathore. While the SC attempted to distinguish between the two terminologies, the SC failed to rigorously apply these standards, leading to an implicit conflation of the two.
The court held that “while Madarsas impart religious instruction, their primary aim is education.”[5] However, Anjum Kadari missed out on examining three things: firstly, whether the religious instruction provided in Madarsas was compulsory or optional, secondly, if the primary aim of the Madarsas is ‘education’, whether it qualified the standards of a ‘secular’ education. Thirdly, whether Madarsas provide faith-based education and does it qualify as ‘religious education’. The first question is relevant because the compulsion of religious instruction would violate Article 28(3); the second question is relevant because ‘secular’ education requires some standards to be met; the third question is relevant because the assertion that the “primary aim is education” lacks clarity as to what kind of education is imparted according to the SC. If it was assumed that it includes faith-based teachings, whether it qualifies as ‘religious education’ remains to be answered. These questions were raised in Anshuman Rathore and were waiting to be settled in Anjum Kadari. However, the SC did not satisfactorily counter the contentions raised by Anshuman Rathore. The paper shall elaborate on how the three points were not adequately addressed.
The first point is that the SC acknowledged that Madarsas, under the Act, did impart religious instruction. It held that it shall still remain immune from violation of Article 28(1) since the primary aim is education. However, the compulsion of religious instruction in state-funded institutions is violative of Article 28(3).[6] The SC failed to confirm whether religious instruction in Madarsas under the Act was optional or compulsory. Whereas Anshuman Rathore was proactive in identifying that the subjects related to religions were compulsory since it was necessary for the students to clear exams in those subjects to be eligible for the next class. Additionally, ‘secular’ subjects were optional. The SC did not engage with such a strong counterpoint. If religious instruction were compulsory, Article 28(3) would be violated. Additionally, if it were compulsory, then the precedent laid down in St Xaviers would also be defied. Ironically, St Xaviers is the precedent that SC relied upon to establish that. SC selectively applied the precedent of St Xaviers. St Xaviers did establish a precedent that allowed religion to be imparted along with education; however, it imposed certain conditions. The education imparted should be strictly secular, and religious training should be optional.[7] The SC ignored these conditions while applying St. Xaviers.
The second point is that the SC claimed that the primary aim is education. However, the SC failed to be cognizant of the nature of the education that the Act was imparting. St Xavier’s allowed for religious instruction along with secular education. According to St Xavier’s, secular education comprises skill and value-based learning targeted to nurture competent individuals fit to participate in a democratic society.[8] It provided a holistic explanation of secular education. SC failed to justify whether the education imparted by Madarsas met these standards. Anshuman Rathore was clear in ascertaining that the education provided in Madarsas was to impart instructions, prescriptions and philosophies of the Islam religion. The Allahabad HC had conducted an extensive analysis to come to this conclusion, which was absent in Anjum Kadari.
Addressing the third point; Even if by ‘education’, the SC meant that Madarsas imparted ‘religious’ education, which would make it immune from the violation of Article 28(1), the SC would still be obliged to justify it according to the precedents it has relied upon. St Xaviers permitted religious education along with secular education. The case of DAV College was cited by the SC to define ‘religious education’; however, the SC did not clarify or answer why imparting theology subjects such as the study of Shia and Sunni practices, rituals, and prescriptions would not amount to religious indoctrination which was a question that Anshuman Rathore raised. Aruna Roy sets a very high threshold for study on religions to be counted as ‘religious education’. The SC is not seen ensuring that dogmas and narrow-minded perceptions are taught in the name of ‘religious education, which was the concern in Aruna Roy and Anshuman Rathore as well. The Allahabad court also did not adequately justify why the study of theology subjects amounted to the indoctrination of a particular religion; however, the responsibility rested on the SC’s shoulders to solve that conundrum.
The SC made assertions rather than arguments, failing to engage with key precedents and counterpoints. Instead of conducting an extensive scrutiny and analysis, it assumed that Madarsas meet constitutional standards. By failing to apply its own distinction between religious education and instruction rigorously, the SC ultimately weakened the clarity of Article 28’s protections. The next part discusses the implication of the precedent set in Anjum Kadari.
Implications of Anjum Kadari
A long line of precedents proves the commitment of the SC to protect secularism in India along with the rights of religious minorities. Article 28(1) and Article 28(3) help the SC execute that protection. This commitment is reflected by the SC’s repeated efforts to maintain a distinction between ‘religious instruction’ and ‘religious education’.
By failing to maintain a rigorous distinction between ‘religious instruction’ and ‘religious instruction’ the SC creates a dangerous loophole of imparting faith-based teaching in the name of education. It is difficult to divorce religions from their dogmas, rituals, mysteries and superstitions, which may not be conducive to a spiritual life.[9] Though all religions claim to be in the pursuit of truth, “they instil fear through the doctrines of reward and punishment.”[10] The imparting of education on religion carries with it the risk of indoctrinating children into a certain dogma or perception; it may magnify one religion and denigrate or degrade other religions, which doesn’t align with the principle of religious pluralism.[11] Religious education, on the other hand, is free from all this. Therefore, teachings in religious institutions should fulfil high standards set by precedents to qualify as ‘religious’ education. Anjum Kadari greatly diluted the high standards that were set by precedents for teachings to qualify as ‘secular’ education, ‘religious’ education or even ‘education’ itself. The lack of scrutiny in Madarsa education could spill over to other religious educational institutions, weakening secular and religious education standards. Religious institutions may misuse this precedent to impart religious instruction and argue that their aim is ‘education’, that meets the ambiguous standard for ‘secular’ or ‘religious’ education set by Anjum Kadari. Therefore, it weakens Article 28(1)’s protection against religious instruction in state-funding institutions. Similarly, failure to establish whether religious instruction in Madarsas is voluntary also undermines Article 28(3). The undermining of Article 28(3) may lead to the indirect compulsion of religious instruction in educational institutions.
In this way, the SC’s implicit conflation of religious instruction and religious education has far-reaching implications, particularly for religious minorities.
Conclusion
Anjum Kadari is a precedent with unintended consequences. While it attempts to navigate the intersection between secularism and the rights of religious minorities, it tilted the balance that had been maintained by the precedents before it. The directions of the Allahabad High Court to hold the Act unconstitutional and direct the students to transfer to ordinary schools does not prove to be an effective way forward. The solution remains to determine the nature of education imparted by the Madarsas and regulate it to conform to the standards set by Article 28(1) and Article 28(3). A more purposive judicial approach should have recognized the need to regulate, rather than dismantle, institutions like Madarsas—ensuring that their educational content conforms to Articles 28(1) and 28(3) without eroding their cultural and religious autonomy. Going forward, courts must adopt a framework that distinguishes state regulation from interference, safeguarding both constitutional secularism and minority rights.
(This post has been authored by Vaishnavi E P, third-year student at WBNUJS, Kolkata)
CITE AS: Vaishnavi E P ‘RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION V. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN ANJUM KADARI – Part I’ (The Contemporary Law Forum, 5 November 2025) <https://tclf.in/2025/11/05/religious-instruction-v-religious-education-unanswered-questions-in-anjum-kadari-part-ii/>date of access.